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INTRODUCTION 
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure set mechanical requirements, rather than 
general guidelines, to determine whether a plaintiff can access the system of federal 
courts.  Because the rules are automatic and familiar, they free up the court’s mental 
resources for proper attention to specific facts, for clashes between important values, 
and for the application of substantive law to unwieldy real-life situations.  Thanks to 
the Rules, a clerk can safely “cut and paste” from any previous case the judge’s 
ground rules for analysis of the pending motion.  The values of this system—
predictability, efficiency, and the kinds of fairness that go with them—are threatened 
when standards of applying the Rules change, as they did after the watershed 2009 
ruling in Ashcroft v. Iqbal.1  When such a change happens, the strength of a 
mechanistic, rules-based system can become its weakness.   
In 2007 and 2009, the Supreme Court altered the governing interpretation of the 
Federal Rules’ pleading standards under Rule 8(a)(2).2  In Bell Atlantic v. Twombly 
and in Iqbal, it authorized federal district courts to act more readily to shield 
defendants from the ordeal of the discovery process.  The cases set a higher 
threshold for a plaintiff to withstand a so-called Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss.  
Under the new standard, courts should dismiss factually sketchy complaints when 
alternative explanations make liability implausible.3  Courts are encouraged to ignore 
“threadbare recitations” of the elements of a claim, and to set aside “conclusory” 
assertions unlinked to factual allegations.4  The associated interpretation of Rule 
8(a)(2) takes seriously the requirement that the complaint’s “short and plain 
statement” truly “show” how the plaintiff is entitled to relief.5   
                                                            
 1 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009). 
 2 Id. at 678-79; Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 557 (2007). 
 3 Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. 
 4 Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. 
 5 FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2). 
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In summer 2009, in response to Iqbal, every federal court redrafted its boilerplate 
presumptions about facts in 12(b)(6) dismissal rulings.  The Court intended this 
result, but there have also been ripple effects6 it did not foresee.  In particular, it did 
not anticipate that the interpretive change to Rule 8(a)(2) would also change Rule 
8(a)(1). 
In any written order of operations—including a judge’s procedure for analyzing 
pleadings—a change in one place can cause unexpected problems elsewhere.  It may 
mean that other instructions need adjusting merely in order to maintain their 
previous significance.  What if the old rule was cross-referenced elsewhere, in a 
different set of boilerplate instructions for judicial decision-making?7  How much 
thought should a court put into the ongoing validity of that cross-reference—
especially when a primary purpose of the Rules is to reduce the need for abstract 
procedural thinking?   
This Note describes a little-observed8 ripple effect of the new pleading standard 
announced in Iqbal, the antiterrorism case whose holding swept broadly and changed 
the ground rules for considering allegations in so-called 12(b)(6) motions for all civil 
cases.9  The 12(b)(6) motion allows the defendant to seek dismissal because the 
document initiating the case—the complaint—fails to allege the elements required 
by the statute it is trying to invoke.  Over the decades before Iqbal, many federal 
courts had come to use part of the procedure for evaluating a 12(b)(6) motion in the 
context of an entirely different kind of ruling.  Courts were always (before Iqbal) 
justified in deploying the 12(b)(6) factual standard for reading complaints in a 
different scenario:  a so-called facial 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss for lack of subject-
matter jurisdiction.10  Even though the former situation involved Rule 8(a)(2) and the 
                                                            
 6 See Animal Sci. Prods. v. China Nat’l Metals & Minerals Imp. & Exp. Corp., 702 F. 
Supp. 2d 320, 334 (D.N.J. 2010) (“it appears logical for the Supreme Court’s guidance in 
Iqbal to have at least a ripple effect on the standard [for subject-matter jurisdiction]”), 
discussed infra at notes 174-78 and accompanying text; Haley Paint Co. v. E.I. DuPont de 
Nemours & Co., 775 F. Supp. 2d 790, 798-99 (D. Md. 2011) (it is “logical” to “appl[y] the 
pleading standards [of Iqbal] to the jurisdictional allegations in the complaint as opposed to 
the factual allegations”), discussed infra at note 179-80, note 216 and accompanying text.  
This Note argues that district courts are wrong to make these “apparently logical” 
extrapolations from Iqbal to the jurisdictional context.  See infra Part IV. 
 7 See Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 513 (2002) (“Other provisions of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are inextricably linked to Rule 8(a)’s simplified notice 
pleading standard.”). 
 8 But see Jordan Shepherd, When Sosa Meets Iqbal: Plausibility Pleading in Human 
Rights Litigation, 95 MINN. L. REV. 2318, 2318-51 (2011) (examining effects of the new 
standard on 12(b)(1) subject-matter jurisdiction rulings in international human-rights litigation 
under the Alien Torts Statute (ATS), and contending that “plausibility does not and need not 
have a huge impact in ATS litigation”). 
 9 See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6) (motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which 
relief can be granted); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2) (requiring a plaintiff’s complaint to 
include “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief” 
(emphasis added)). 
 10 See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(1) (motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction); 
see also FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(1) (requiring a plaintiff’s complaint to include “a short and plain 
statement of the grounds for the court’s jurisdiction”). 
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latter involved Rule 8(a)(1), the difference did not matter:  the same generous 
treatment of facts applied to both.  Under Iqbal, that is no longer true. 
Because of the longstanding cross-reference, when the Supreme Court changed 
the 12(b)(6) standard, it unwittingly changed the approach many district courts 
would take in 12(b)(1) motions as well.  There is ample reason to believe the Court 
did this unwittingly, and will move to correct district courts that maintain the 
outdated cross-reference.11   
Although it solved one procedural problem by requiring plausibility in the 
complaint, the Iqbal Court created new problems in another area of the law.  These 
difficulties are in an unrelated area of doctrine (subject-matter jurisdiction), and are 
of an entirely different order than the ones Twombly and Iqbal sought to address.  
Unwittingly, in taking the keys to discovery away from speculative plaintiffs,12 the 
Court gave permission for federal judges to borrow the keys to a new vehicle:  
heightened plausibility standards for subject-matter jurisdiction.  Emerging as a 
result is a new kind of “drive-by jurisdictional ruling”13 of the kind the Court has 
often sought to end. 
This Note examines the interplay between the Twombly/Iqbal doctrine and 
federal courts’ practical approach to subject-matter jurisdiction.  Part II describes the 
background jurisprudence on subject-matter jurisdiction, including the sharp line the 
Supreme Court has consistently re-drawn between claims lacking merit and those 
lacking jurisdictional basis, from Bell v. Hood through Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp.  The 
consistent theme of this jurisprudence is that courts should not conflate merits and 
jurisdictional questions, and that judges should readily activate the court’s 
jurisdiction in response to a simple allegation in the complaint.  Part III then 
describes the recent change to pleading standards on the merits of a claim.  It 
explains the origins, factual context, and doctrinal bases of the altered pleading 
standard introduced in Iqbal and Twombly.  These rationales do not, in most cases, 
apply to motions to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. 
In Part IV, lower-court case law reveals that since 2009, in practice, the Iqbal 
standard has been interfering with the agenda of Arbaugh, in a way that the Supreme 
Court did not intend.  Federal judges, in their eagerness to apply the novel pleading 
standard of Iqbal, have neglected the jurisdictional teachings of the Supreme Court 
                                                            
 11 In the terminology of computer programming, the Iqbal Court altered a subroutine 
(“factual pleading standard”) without considering all the contexts in which that subroutine is 
triggered.  The debugging approach called a “stack trace” operates partly by flagging such 
troublesome cross-references when code is altered.  See DORIAN ARNOLD ET AL., INT’L 
PARALLEL & DISTRIB. PROCESSING SYMPOSIUM, STACK TRACE ANALYSIS FOR LARGE SCALE 
DEBUGGING (Mar. 2007), available at ftp://ftp.cs.wisc.edu/paradyn/papers/ 
Arnold06STAT.pdf (recommending a debugging approach that distinguishes the contexts in 
which subroutines are invoked because “functions invoked via different call paths . . . may 
demonstrate different application semantics to the user that would not be visible without this 
distinction”).  Such a tool would have indicated to the Court that 12(b)(1) “algorithms” often 
invoke the “factual pleading standard” subroutine, and hence that changes to that subroutine 
could alter 12(b)(1) outputs as well as 12(b)(6) outputs.  The Court did not anticipate this 
result, so its instructions for applying the Federal Rules need debugging after the fact. 
 12 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009) (“Rule 8 . . . does not unlock the doors of 
discovery for a plaintiff armed with nothing more than conclusions”). 
 13 Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 91 (1998). 
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in the Arbaugh line of cases.  As a result, since Iqbal an erroneous 12(b)(1) standard 
has propagated rapidly through circuit and lower courts.   
If the application of Iqbal to jurisdictional pleadings is an error, as this Note 
maintains and as recent Supreme Court reaffirmations of Arbaugh suggest, it may 
prove difficult to eradicate.  Part V addresses the ineffectiveness of circuit courts and 
the rules-based system in correcting such mistakes.  Indeed, in recent years, the 
Supreme Court continued to reaffirm (as it has for two decades) the importance of 
accepting subject-matter jurisdiction14—even while the rest of the federal system 
increasingly deployed Iqbal to make it more difficult to invoke the power of the 
courts. 
The leakage of Iqbal plausibility requirements into rulings on subject-matter 
jurisdiction exemplifies the problem of unintended consequences in civil-procedure 
jurisprudence.  Since 2009, federal courts have faced a doctrinal dilemma.  The 
teaching of Twombly and Iqbal is that cases should be more readily dismissed before 
discovery for failure to state a claim.15  And yet, for at least fifteen years, the 
Supreme Court has consistently urged lower courts to grant fewer dismissals before 
discovery for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.16  These two mandates push in 
opposite directions, and reconciling them requires judges to master the elusive 
distinction between a complaint’s legal sufficiency and its jurisdictional basis.  
Without guidance from the Supreme Court in a case squarely presenting the question 
of Iqbal and subject-matter jurisdiction, the error is likely to persist. 
I.  GETTING INTO COURT:  FROM BELL AND CONLEY TO ARBAUGH 
The pre-Iqbal pleading standards for both 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) motions can be 
traced to the same case, Conley v. Gibson.17  That case underscored the remarkable 
leniency the Rules mandated in reading the complaint:  a plaintiff simply needed to 
allege the factual presence of each of the elements of the cause of action.18  The court 
would then assume all the alleged facts were true.19  Such pure credulity was 
                                                            
 14 See Union Pac. R.R. v. Bhd. of Locomotive Eng’rs, 130 S. Ct. 584, 590 (2009), 
discussed infra Part V. 
 15 Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679 (complaint is inadequate, and case should be dismissed, “where 
the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of 
misconduct”). 
 16 Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 89 (jurisdictional dismissal is “proper only when the [federal] 
claim is so insubstantial . . . as not to involve a federal controversy”) (emphasis added) 
(citation omitted). 
 17 Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957). 
 18 See Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 514 (2002) (“The liberal notice 
pleading of Rule 8(a) is the starting point of a simplified pleading system, which was adopted 
to focus litigation on the merits of a claim.”) (citing Conley, 355 U.S. at 48); see also Pressed 
Steel Car Co. v. Union Pac. R. Co., 241 F. 964, 966 (D.N.Y. 1917) (Hand, J.) (earlier in the 
trend toward more lenient pleading standards, noting that under the “new rules,” “the 
pleadings shall contain no evidence, but the ‘ultimate facts’”). 
 19 See, e.g., Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974) (dismissal should not be granted 
even if “[i]t may appear on the face of the pleadings that a recovery is very remote and 
unlikely. . . . [T]he allegations of the complaint should be construed favorably to the 
pleader.”). 
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required of judges at this phase under the premise that the complaint served only to 
give the defendant notice as to what conduct was at issue.20  The court would be 
entitled to activate its skepticism after discovery.   
In Conley, lower courts had dismissed a discrimination lawsuit railway workers 
had brought against their own union.21  In a now-famous formula reinstating the suit, 
the Supreme Court described the “notice pleading” standard district courts were to 
use henceforward in ruling on 12(b)(6) motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim 
upon which relief can be granted:  “a complaint should not be dismissed for failure 
to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of 
facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.”22  Through 2008, the 
case would be directly cited for this proposition 18,539 times.23  
Notably, however, Conley itself was not decided by this reasoning.  The Court 
issued its famous “no set of facts” formula—explaining Rule 12(b)(6) and its 
associated pleading guideline, Rule 8(a)(2)—as dictum.24  The actual holding in 
Conley hinged on a jurisdictional question and a motion to dismiss under Rule 
12(b)(1).  In the lower courts the case had been dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, not 
because the plaintiffs had failed to state a cause of action. The defendant union’s 
winning argument below had been that a federal statute assigned railroad labor 
disputes in the first instance to the National Railroad Adjustment Board (NRAB), 
and that therefore the federal courts lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over the 
conflict under Rule 8(a)(1).25  Reversal by the Supreme Court meant that federal 
court was the right place for the conflict, since it was not a dispute between labor and 
management, as NRAB cases were, but between a union and its own members.26 
Conley, then, was a jurisdictional decision that became famous for defining the 
requirements for pleadings on the merits.  In this muddled double identity it is the 
shared ancestor for two opposed, increasingly urgent, and often conflated strands of 
legal doctrine that emerged in the Supreme Court over the last thirty years.  One line 
of precedents has to do with jurisdiction, a court’s power to decide a case; the second 
has to do with proper invocation of a law, which establishes the court’s duty in 
deciding a case.  In the first line of precedents, following in the footsteps of Conley, 
                                                            
 20  Conley, 355 U.S. at 48 (“The Federal Rules reject the approach that pleading is a game 
of skill in which one misstep by counsel may be decisive to the outcome.”). 
 21 Id. at 44. 
 22 Id. at 46; see also id. at 47-48 (such leniency in evaluating the complaint “is made 
possible by the liberal opportunity for discovery and the other pretrial procedures established 
by the Rules to disclose more precisely the basis of both claim and defense and to define more 
narrowly the disputed facts and issues”); cf. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 
(2007) (requiring “enough fact to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal 
evidence” to substantiate the claim). 
 23 Lexis “Restrict by Headnote” Search, Lexis Advance, advance.lexis.com (Search 
Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957); then Shepardize by Headnote 3, restricting prior to 
year 2009). 
 24 Alana C. Jochum, Pleading in Ohio After Bell Atlantic v. Twombly and Ashcroft v. 
Iqbal, 58 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 495, 502 n.47 (2010). 
 25 Conley, 355 U.S. at 43-44. 
 26 Id. at 45. 
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the Court urges lower courts to accept federal subject-matter jurisdiction, rather than 
looking for reasons to abjure their power.  This tradition culminated with Arbaugh v. 
Y & H Corp., which held that legal shortcomings in a complaint should rarely be 
regarded as destroying the court’s jurisdiction.27  In the second line of precedents, 
however, the Supreme Court has sought to make federal courts stricter in evaluating 
whether the plaintiff has adequately stated a claim.  This doctrine culminated in the 
rulings of Twombly and Iqbal, which led every federal district to revise its 
boilerplate.  Through these two strands of doctrine, the Supreme Court has 
simultaneously, and laudably, advanced two distinct agendas:  to broaden the power 
of the federal judiciary, and to narrow its duty. 
A.  Lenient Standards for Jurisdiction Before Discovery 
The operative reasoning in Conley explained why federal courts were the 
appropriate places to decide the dispute between the railway workers and their own 
union.28  Like all jurisdictional questions, this was primarily a question of law, 
hinging on interpretation of a Congressional act—but like all jurisdictional 
questions, it also depended on seeing the facts properly.  The essence of the lower 
court’s ruling had been that the plaintiffs were ignoring Congress’s requirements by 
bringing a railway labor dispute to the federal courts.29  Since Congress had given 
jurisdiction over railway labor disputes to a specially created body, the National 
Railroad Adjustment Board, the lower courts dismissed the case before discovery.30  
The Supreme Court, however, determined that Congress had not intended to strip 
federal courts of jurisdiction for all disputes involving railway labor unions, only 
those between unions and the railways themselves.31  From one perspective, the 
Court’s decision was purely legal, since it interpreted the statute.  From another 
perspective, though, the decision required the Court to make a factual determination 
that the dispute in Conley was truly intramural, and not merely a reframing of a 
conflict between the plaintiffs and their employer.32 
Such factual determinations are delicate matters when presented as threshold 
questions, before a case is properly underway.  In Conley, the Railroad was not a 
party to the case, so in hindsight it seems clear that the case was not a labor dispute 
of the sort Congress intended to assign to the Adjustment Board.  But the defendant 
union argued that the Railroad should have been joined as a party,33 and this 
                                                            
 27 Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 504 (2006). 
 28  Conley, 355 U.S at 44-45. 
 29 Id. at 43. 
 30 Id. 
 31 Id. at 44-45. 
 32 Cf. United Transp. Union v. Gateway W. Ry., 78 F.3d 1208, 1213-1214 (7th Cir. 1996) 
(The Railway Labor Act requires that “when the precise character of the dispute is in 
doubt . . . a federal court should not proceed, for the [National Mediation Board] has primary 
jurisdiction to determine whether it has exclusive jurisdiction over the dispute.”) (quoting 
United Transp. Union v. United States, 987 F.2d 784, 789 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (internal quotation 
marks omitted)).  The Adjustment Board involved in Conley is an arm of the Mediation Board 
created by the Railway Labor Act.  See 45 U.S.C.S. § 153(w) (LexisNexis 2011). 
 33 Conley, 355 U.S. at 45.   
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argument was not frivolous.  Most of the plaintiffs’ allegations were not about the 
union’s treatment of the plaintiffs:  they alleged, instead, that the Railroad was 
administering the union contract in a discriminatory way, “with the active or tacit 
consent of the union.”34  The Supreme Court saw no basis in the record yet for a 
joinder of the Railroad (although it had to acknowledge such a basis might 
emerge).35  This ruling on the slim factual record, leaving the Railroad out of the 
case, deactivated what would otherwise have been a classic jurisdictional paradox.  
The contrary determination—that the Railroad was a necessary defendant in the 
case—would arguably have stripped the federal courts of the power to make any 
finding at all, since the NRAB would then have had exclusive jurisdiction.36  In such 
a scenario, a federal court might decide a question at issue only to learn as a result, 
retroactively, that it was not the right body to decide questions in the case.  Fearing 
entanglement in such paradoxes, many courts in similar cases struggle to define the 
basis for dismissal, sometimes calling it jurisdictional and sometimes calling it 
failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.37 
The Court in Conley reversed the district court’s jurisdictional dismissal and 
instructed it to take the case.  Because the facts did not point to necessary joinder of 
the Railroad, Conley was able to follow the lead of a slightly older case, Bell v. 
Hood, which not only set the standard for a finding of jurisdiction but also sought to 
minimize occasions for the jurisdictional paradox just described: 
Where the complaint, as here, is so drawn as to seek recovery directly 
under the Constitution or laws of the United States, the federal court . . . 
must entertain the suit . . . .  The reason for this is that the court must 
assume jurisdiction to decide whether the allegations state a cause of 
action on which the court can grant relief as well as to determine issues of 
fact arising in the controversy.38 
In other words, the legal sufficiency of the complaint—its success in stating a 
claim—defines the court’s duty.  But regardless of whether the court has a duty to 
offer relief, it must first determine whether it has power to hear the question:  hence, 
the jurisdictional determination is distinct from and precedent to the merits 
question.39  The standard is lenient:  if federal law is properly invoked, jurisdiction 
should be declined only if the Rule 8(a)(1) statement is “wholly insubstantial and 
                                                            
 34 Id. at 46. 
 35 Id. at 45 (“This is not a suit, directly or indirectly, against the Railroad. . . . If an issue 
does develop which necessitates joining the Railroad either it or the respondents will then 
have an adequate opportunity to request joinder.”). 
 36 See Bhd. of Locomotive Eng’rs & Trainmen v. CSX Transp., Inc., 455 F.3d 1313, 1316 
(11th Cir. 2006) (NRAB findings cannot be reviewed in federal court unless they overstep the 
Board’s jurisdictional mandate). 
 37 See generally Howard M. Wasserman, Jurisdiction and Merits, 80 WASH. L. REV. 643 
(2005). 
 38 Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 681-82 (1946) (emphasis added).  
 39 See generally Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83 (1998) (insisting on 
the priority of determining plaintiff’s standing, which enables subject-matter jurisdiction, and 
insisting that courts should so do so in an analysis distinct from adjudging whether the 
complaint properly alleges the elements required by the statute). 
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frivolous.”40  This teaching of Bell is affirmed in a distinct and nearly undisturbed 
line of cases41 in which the Court sought to lay to rest what seems to be a perennial 
confusion between a court’s power and its duty.  This tradition culminates with 
Arbaugh v. Y. & H. Corp.,42 a unanimous ruling that sought to law down a clear 
mandate:  afterward, the Court hoped, the distinction between jurisdiction and merits 
would be easy to discern and maintain.43  But the jurisdictional facts are not always 
resolved as easily as they were in Conley.  Even with a bright-line rule, courts have 
continued to struggle with this issue.44 
B.  Statutory Requirements are Rarely Jurisdictional 
Unlike the aggrieved employees in Conley, the plaintiff in Arbaugh v. Y & H 
Corp. had a simple statutory basis for her federal claim:  she alleged, and proved to a 
jury, that she had been sexually harassed at her place of employment, the Moonlight 
Cafe.  The federal statute known as Title VII establishes that such sexual harassment 
claims can be brought to federal court.45  But the facts were more complicated than 
                                                            
 40 Bell, 327 U.S. at 682-83 (“[The only] exceptions are that a suit may sometimes be 
dismissed for want of jurisdiction where the alleged claim , , , clearly appears to be immaterial 
and made solely for the purpose of obtaining jurisdiction or where such a claim is wholly 
insubstantial and frivolous.”). 
 41 See, e.g., Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 352 n.2 (1996); Fed. Election Comm’n v. Nat’l 
Rifle Ass’n Political Victory Fund, 513 U.S. 88, 97 (1994); Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Cnty. 
of Kent, 510 U.S. 355, 365 (1994) (“The question whether a federal statute creates a claim for 
relief is not jurisdictional.”); Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Env’l Study Grp., 438 U.S. 59, 70 
(1978); Oneida Indian Nation of N.Y. v. Cnty. of Oneida, 414 U.S. 661, 667 (1974) (courts 
should find jurisdiction unless federal claim is “so insubstantial, implausible, foreclosed by 
prior decisions of this Court, or otherwise completely devoid of merit as not to involve a 
federal controversy”); Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 542 n.10 (1974) (“Once a federal 
court has ascertained that a plaintiff’s jurisdiction-conferring claims are not insubstantial on 
their face, no further consideration of the merits of the claims is relevant to a determination of 
the court’s jurisdiction of the subject matter.”) (citations and quotation marks omitted); Powell 
v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 512-16 (1969); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 198-204 (1962); 
Romero v. Int’l Terminal Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354, 359 (1959).  But see Bowles v. 
Russell, 551 U.S. 205, 214 (2007) (“the timely filing of a notice of appeal in a civil case is a 
jurisdictional requirement”); Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc., 
484 U.S. 49, 67 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (contending that majority decision “misreads 
statute to create a peculiar new form of subject-matter jurisdiction”).  Bowles appears to have 
been confined to its particular context.  See Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick, 130 S. Ct. 1237, 
1250 (2010) (Ginsberg, J., concurring) (attempting to reconcile Arbaugh and Bowles on the 
principle of stare decisis).  Compare Bowles, 551 U.S. at 214 (statutory limit on appeal of 
ordinary civil case is jurisdictional) with Henderson v. Shinseki, 131 S. Ct. 1197, 1202 (2011) 
(statutory limit on appeal of benefits decision to Veterans Court is not jurisdictional, and is 
subject to equitable tolling). See generally Howard Wasserman, The Demise of “Drive-by 
Jurisdictional Rulings,” 105 NW. L. REV. 184-202 (2011). 
 42 Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 511 (2006) (“On the subject-matter 
jurisdiction/ingredient-of-claim-for-relief dichotomy, this Court and others have been less 
than meticulous.”). 
 43 Steel Co., 523 U.S. 83 (1998). 
 44 See infra discussion in Part IV. 
 45 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3) (2006). 
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the law:  it emerged after the trial was over that because of its payroll structure, the 
Moonlight Cafe did not, under the technical definition of “employee,” actually have 
enough employees to be subject to the statute.46  The defendant discovered that this 
argument was available only after the trial was over.  It was too late to assert that 
Arbaugh had failed to state a claim for which relief could be granted, in a 12(b)(6) 
motion.47  The issue had not been preserved for appeal.  The defendant would have 
to pay the $40,000 initially ordered by the federal court, even though Congress had 
not intended it to be reached by the law.  Two weeks after the verdict, however, the 
employer made a different motion, which is allowed at any time, even after trial:  a 
motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.48  According to this 
argument, the cafe, employing fewer than fifteen people, had not had its conduct as 
an employer placed under the jurisdiction of the federal courts.49  The entire case 
should be undone, not because of an error of law, but because that error meant it had 
come to the wrong court. 
Arbaugh presented very clearly the classic problem of distinguishing between 
jurisdiction and merits—one that had created a circuit split with regard to Title 
VII50—and also an indication of why the difference matters.  A court that lacks 
jurisdiction must forswear all its power over a controversy, even after it has already 
ruled, whereas a claim that misreads the law or fails to satisfy its prerequisites 
nonetheless comes under the court’s power because it “arises under” a federal 
statute.51  Usually, the plaintiff loses before federal discovery either way, but in this 
instance, the Supreme Court faced a true controversy on the question of why she 
should have lost.  Did the trial court lack the power to issue its verdict, or only the 
duty?  If dismissal should have occurred for 12(b)(1) reasons of judicial power, the 
error would be corrected and the plaintiff sent away to try her luck in state court; if it 
should have been for 12(b)(6) reasons of judicial duty, the erroneous (but just) 
verdict would be upheld.   
Arbaugh won.  A statute’s inapplicability does not alter the jurisdiction of a 
federal court to decide whether it applies.  Justice Ginsburg, writing for a unanimous 
court, overruled the Fifth Circuit’s precedents52 that had established the employee-
numerosity requirement of Title VII as jurisdictional: 
[W]hen Congress does not rank a statutory limitation on coverage as 
jurisdictional, courts should treat the restriction as nonjurisdictional in 
                                                            
 46 Arbaugh, 546 U.S. at 509 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (2006)). 
 47 See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(h)(2) (specifying “at trial” as the last opportunity for such a 
motion). 
 48 Arbaugh, 546 U.S. at 506 (“Whenever it appears by suggestion of the parties or 
otherwise that the court lacks jurisdiction of the subject matter, the court shall dismiss the 
action.”) (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 12(h)(3)). 
 49 Id. at 504. 
 50 See Da Silva v. Kinsho Int’l Corp., 229 F.3d 358, 364-66 (2d Cir. 2000) (listing 
conflicting cases in different circuits, and holding correctly that “the threshold number of 
employees for application of Title VII is not a jurisdictional issue”). 
 51 See 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2006) (granting federal courts jurisdiction for all civil disputes 
properly invoking a federal law). 
 52 See, e.g., Greenlees v. Eidenmuller Enters., Inc., 32 F.3d 197, 198 (5th Cir. 1994). 
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character. Applying that readily administrable bright line to this case, we 
hold that the threshold number of employees for application of Title VII is 
an element of a plaintiff's claim for relief, not a jurisdictional issue.53 
In settling this question, the Court not only laid down a clear rule for federal 
district courts to follow; it also made clear its intent with regard to the distinct 
character of subject-matter jurisdiction.  The Arbaugh ruling punctuated the series of 
cases in which the Supreme Court voiced its disapproval of quick dismissals that 
interpret a statute while purporting to invoke Rule 12(b)(1)—what the Court has 
repeatedly called “‘drive-by jurisdictional rulings’ that should be accorded ‘no 
precedential effect.’”54  Repeatedly over the last two decades, the Supreme Court has 
expressed its frustration with federal courts declining jurisdiction when they should 
instead dismiss cases on the merits.55  Correct doctrine, the Court insists, requires a 
sharp distinction to be maintained.  There is a qualitative difference between what a 
federal court can do, but should not (on the merits); and what it arguably should do, 
but cannot (for lack of jurisdiction). 
Unless Congress clearly specifies otherwise, a law is activated in federal court 
whenever it is invoked, and the court must take jurisdiction even if the complaint 
misreads the law.  In holding to this effect, Arbaugh seems on its face to lay to rest 
for lower courts the distinction between jurisdiction and merits.56  But the same 
might have been said about the resounding logical victory of Justice Scalia over 
Justice Stevens in 1996,57 or Bell v. Hood itself, or an equally confident and assertive 
explanation laid down by Justice Holmes in 1908.58  The problem of distinguishing 
jurisdiction from merits seems to be passed from generation to generation.59 
                                                            
 53  Arbaugh, 546 U.S. at 516. 
 54 Id. at 511 (quoting Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 91 (1998)).   
 55 See generally Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 88-102 (holding that federal court must decide first 
whether there was any injury to establish standing of plaintiffs, and therefore jurisdiction of 
court, in claim against a steel and pickling company tardy in complying with the 
environmental-records requirement of 42 U.S.C. § 11046 (2006), before the court decides 
whether the statute’s creation of a private cause of action against noncompliant entities 
allowed for such retroactive suits) (emphasis added). 
 56 See also United States v. North Carolina, 180 F.3d 574, 581 (4th Cir. 1999) (denying 
12(b)(1) motion because “while the merits and jurisdictional questions are not identical, they 
are so closely related that the jurisdictional issue is not suited for resolution in the context of a 
motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction”) (citing Adams v. Bain, 697 F.2d 
1213, 1219 (4th Cir. 1982)). 
 57 Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 118-119 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“Bell demonstrates that the 
Court has the power to decide whether a cause of action exists even when it is unclear whether 
the plaintiff has standing”) (citing Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 685 (1946)); see also id. at 119 
n.9 (professing to see no “fundamental difference between arguing: (1) plaintiff’s complaint 
does not allege a cause of action because the law does ‘not provide a remedy’ for the 
plaintiff’s injury; and (2) plaintiff’s injury is ‘not redressable’ [for standing purposes]”); id. at 
96 (Scalia, J.) (“[n]ot only is this not true, but the whole point of Bell was that it is not true,” 
because money damages would have provided redress if they had not been disallowed on the 
merits). 
 58 Fauntleroy v. Lum, 210 U.S. 230, 234-35 (1908).  (“No doubt it sometimes may be 
difficult to decide whether certain words in a statute are directed to jurisdiction or to merits, 
but the distinction between the two is plain.  One goes to power, the other only to the duty of 
 
11Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2012
810 CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 60:799 
 
C.  Determining Power Before Determining Duty:  Progress in Eliminating “Drive-
by Jurisdictional Rulings”  
Steadily, over time, the Court’s persistent rejection of jurisdictional grounds for 
dismissals on the merits had the desired effect in lower courts.60  The teaching of 
Arbaugh and other cases in the same vein was being heeded in the years leading up 
to Iqbal.61  In the Sixth Circuit, for example, in January 2006, a panel reasoning by 
analogy heeded Supreme Court decisions from 2004 and 2005 and “departed from 
[its] usual rule that one panel may not overrule a prior panel.”62  The issue was 
whether a necessary dismissal in the district court should have been characterized as 
a jurisdictional problem or a failure to state a claim,63 and, as in Arbaugh, there was 
something riding on the outcome.   
The defendants in the case, a couple named Gunter, had had their medical costs 
covered by a tortfeasor, and then had been sued for reimbursement by their health 
plan to prevent a windfall.64  The parties did not realize that the statute apparently 
authorizing the suit had been interpreted in 2002 to create injunctive relief only, and 
not to allow for awards of money.65  Moreover, the Sixth Circuit had found, based on 
dicta in two dissenting opinions, that this was a jurisdictional issue,66 and the District 
Court accordingly should have dismissed the case for lack of subject-matter 
jurisdiction.  Instead, it heard the case and found that as a factual matter the Gunters 
were entitled to keep all the money in question, roughly $75,000.  In the process, 
however, the Gunters racked up attorney’s fees of $67,000; they petitioned the court 
for reimbursement in turn from the health plan, under a pertinent Employee 
                                                            
the court. . . .  Whether a given statute is intended simply to establish a rule of substantive law, 
and thus to define the duty of the court, or is meant to limit its power, is a question of 
construction and common sense.”). 
 59 See Wasserman 2011, supra note 41, at 201-02 (“The Court apparently is not finished 
undoing profligate and non-meticulous use of the concept of jurisdiction, moving towards a 
sharper distinction between judicial adjudicative authority on the one hand and merits or 
procedure on the other.”). 
 60 See, e.g., Montez v. Dep’t of Navy, 392 F.3d 147, 150 (5th Cir. 2004) (“[W]here issues 
of fact are central both to subject matter jurisdiction and the claim on the merits, we have held 
that the trial court must assume jurisdiction and proceed to the merits.”).  
 61 See, e.g., Braden v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 588 F.3d 585, 592 (8th Cir. 2009) (“The 
district court erred by conflating the issue of Braden’s Article III standing with his potential 
personal causes of action under ERISA.”).  See generally Howard M. Wasserman, 
Jurisdiction, Merits, and Substantiality, 42 TULSA L. REV. 579, 580-84 (2007). 
 62 Primax Recoveries, Inc. v. Gunter, 433 F. 3d 515, 516 (6th Cir. 2006). 
 63 See id. at 517 (“Generations of jurists have struggled with the difficulty of 
distinguishing between Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) in federal question cases.”) (quoting 
Nowak v. Ironworkers Local 6 Pension Fund, 81 F.3d 1182, 1188 (2d Cir. 1996)). 
 64 Id. at 516-17. 
 65 See id. at 517 (citing Great W. Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson, 534 U.S. 204, 221 
(2002)); see also Knudson, 534 U.S. at 222, 224 (dissenting Justices Stevens and Ginsberg 
characterizing the outcome in that case as a jurisdictional one). 
 66 Id. (citing QualChoice, Inc. v. Rowland, 367 F. 3d 638, 642 (6th Cir. 2004) and 
Community Health Plan of Ohio v. Mosser, 347 F.3d 619 (6th Cir. 2003)). 
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Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) provision for successful defendants.67  
With admirable chutzpah, the plaintiff then pointed out correctly that it should have 
lost not on the merits, but for jurisdictional reasons, without a trial.  In response, the 
district court held that it had never had jurisdiction over the case and therefore could 
not award the attorney’s fees.68  The Gunters pressed the question in the Sixth 
Circuit, pointing out two intervening Supreme Court decisions. 
Even though those decisions seemed to have nothing to do with the Gunters’ 
case, they were utterly persuasive to the Sixth Circuit panel.  In them, as in Arbaugh, 
the Supreme Court had continued to fight the good fight against jurisdictional 
treatments of legal defects in the pleadings.  One ruling had held that a defense 
arising from a certain Bankruptcy Rule was a merits defense, not a jurisdictional one, 
and therefore could not be raised after trial.69  The other had held that the time limit 
in Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 33 had the same nonjurisdictional status, 
giving the state an argument that had to be raised  up front, and not as a collateral 
attack on jurisdiction.70   
From these unrelated high-court rulings on matters of bankruptcy and criminal 
procedure, the Primax Court got the message about Rule 12(b)(1).71  The Court 
changed the Circuit standard on the jurisdictional character of the original error, 
vacated the District Court’s disavowal of subject-matter jurisdiction, and awarded 
attorney’s fees to the Gunters:  “Our application of Eberhart and Kontrick to the 
instant case faithfully adheres to the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence where, as here, 
both the court’s subject-matter jurisdiction and the substantive claim for relief are 
based on the same federal statute.”72  Accepting jurisdiction and deciding what the 
law permits are separate matters.  An initial error of law should not be compounded 
with an error of doctrine.   
Having taken a case and created an outcome, a court should not itself later 
disavow its own power to do what it did, as if the bell of litigation can be unrung.  
Primax demonstrates that even before Iqbal, there were practical reasons behind the 
Supreme Court’s consistent urgings that courts should accept their subject-matter 
jurisdiction.  Now those reasons have been augmented, because the Court has 
created different standards for evaluating jurisdiction and legal sufficiency. 
II.  STATING A CLAIM:  FROM CONLEY TO IQBAL 
Whereas Rule 12(b)(1) regulates the proper invocation of a federal court’s 
power, Rule 12(b)(6) is concerned with the threshold a complaint must then clear to 
“state a claim,” allowing the plaintiff to issue subpoenas and discovery requests.  For 
constitutional and practical reasons, this gate to the discovery process is being 
guarded more and more zealously.  First, more-conservative justices, under the aegis 
of “restraint,” are increasingly inclined to turn plaintiffs away while invoking the 
                                                            
 67 29 U.S.C. § 1132(g) (2006). 
 68 Primax Recoveries, Inc. v. Gunter, 433 F.3d 515, 517 (6th Cir. 2006). 
 69 Kontrick v. Ryan, 540 U.S. 443, 455-56 (2004). 
 70 Eberhart v. United States, 546 U.S. 12 (2005) (per curiam). 
 71 Primax, 433 F.3d at 519. 
 72 Id. (citing Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 89 (1998)). 
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constitutional imperative of federal courts’ limited jurisdiction.73  Second, and more 
relevant here, courts are becoming more aware that clearing the 12(b)(6) obstacle 
enables plaintiffs to subject their adversaries to the machinery of civil litigation 
itself.74  In recent years, the Supreme Court decided to make that machinery more 
difficult to activate. 
A.  Twombly Dismissals Prevent Speculative Discovery Proceedings 
With the growth of organizations of all kinds,75 the improvement of record-
keeping technology,76 and the increased generosity of tort law both as to liability and 
as to damages,77 litigation itself, as a process and a prospect, has become a powerful 
weapon.  As discovery has become more expensive, motions to dismiss before 
discovery for failure to state a claim have become more important.  The rulings in 
Twombly and Iqbal were the culmination of a steadily increasing awareness in the 
higher courts that discovery should, in some cases, be more difficult to initiate.  To 
allege the basis for a cause of action, plaintiffs should not simply name, or break 
down into its elements and recite, the law they wanted to invoke:  they needed to 
allege facts. 78 
                                                            
 73 See, e.g., Ramirez de Arellano v. Weinberger, 745 F.2d 1500, 1560-61 (D.C. Cir. 1984) 
(en banc) (Scalia, J., joined by Bork and Starr, JJ., dissenting from remand for factual 
development) (“Having ignored one jurisdictional restraint and distorted another, the majority 
proceeds to treat the merits of this case with what seems to me an incomprehensible disregard 
of traditional principles of equitable discretion, bordering on if not surpassing the 
constitutional limits established by the principle of separation of powers.”), vacated for 
reconsideration in light of Congressional action, 471 U.S. 1113 (per curiam); see also Hamdi 
v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 586 (2004) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (citing the de Arellano dissent 
and arguing that “judicial interference in domains [of antiterrorism] destroys the purpose of 
vesting primary responsibility in a unitary Executive”). 
 74 See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 742-43 (1975) (“[T]he mere 
existence of an unresolved lawsuit has settlement value to the plaintiff . . . because of the 
threat of extensive discovery.”). 
 75 Compare The Fortune 100: 1957, CNNMONEY (2012), http://money.cnn.com/ 
magazines/ fortune/fortune500_archive/full/1957/index.html (indicating that the total 1957 
revenues for the one-hundred largest U.S. companies was $115 billion, the equivalent in 2007 
dollars of $869 billion), with The Fortune 100: 2007, CNNMONEY (2012), 
http://money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/fortune500/2007/full_list/index.html (indicating that 
the total 2007 revenues for the one-hundred largest U.S. companies was $6,088 billion).  See 
also Inflation Calculator, DOLLARTIMES (2012), http://www.dollartimes.com/calculators/ 
inflation.htm. 
 76 See Rowe Entm’t, Inc. v. William Morris Agency, Inc., 205 F.R.D. 421, 429 (S.D.N.Y. 
2002) (noting in dispute over costs of electronic discovery that when “the costs of storage are 
virtually nil . . . [i]nformation is retained not because it is expected to be used, but because 
there is no compelling reason to discard it.  And, even if data is retained for limited purposes, 
it is not necessarily amenable to discovery.”). 
 77 See, e.g., Thing v. La Chusa, 771 P.2d 814, 816 (Cal. 1989) (tracing “the development 
of common law recognition of a protectable interest in individual peace of mind.”). 
 78 Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 563 (2007); see Richard A. Epstein, Bell 
Atlantic v. Twombly: How Motions to Dismiss Become (Disguised) Summary Judgments, 25 
WASH. U. J. L. & POL’Y 61, 94 (2007) (arguing that Twombly was correct, because courts can 
capably adjudge pleadings implausible based on “a full account of all public information”). 
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For many decades this commonsense doctrine79 did not enter the common law at 
the highest levels, with one important exception.  Over a sustained period, circuit 
courts adopted a heightened pleading standard for allegations of conspiracy, which is 
a crime or tort likely to develop (if at all) behind closed doors, and therefore to be 
pled based on speculation.  On the circuit level, the common law developed to 
require judges to cast a skeptical eye on allegations of conspiracy, even before 
discovery.80  For many decades, circuit courts’ special treatment of conspiracy “was 
a narrow exception to the notice-pleading standard of Rule 8 of the civil rules—a 
rare example of a judicially imposed requirement to plead facts in a complaint 
governed by Rule 8.”81  This tradition with regard to conspiracy claims would inform 
the Supreme Court’s eventual reinterpretation of pleading standards in Twombly and 
Iqbal. 
The heart of the Twombly doctrine is that a complaint’s allegations about illegal 
conduct behind closed doors must be plausible inferences from conduct the plaintiff 
knows about.82  If all the facts shown in a pleading can be very readily explained, as 
a matter of basic common sense, without any wrongdoing involved, the “doors of 
discovery” should not be unlocked for the plaintiff to peruse the defendant’s files.83  
Hence, cases should be ended at the motion-to-dismiss stage when all the facts 
plaintiff can allege leave the court unconvinced that there is any “reason to infer that 
[the defendants] had agreed among themselves to do what was only natural 
anyway.”84  The doctrine prevents antitrust litigation that amounts to a shakedown, 
using discovery rather than the prospect of an actual judgment to create leverage.85 
                                                            
 79 See, e.g., Sprewell v. Golden State Warriors, 266 F.3d 979, 988 (9th Cir. 2001) (court 
need not accept as true legal conclusions couched as factual allegations); Kowal v. MCI 
Commc’ns Corp., 16 F.3d 1271, 1276 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (same). 
 80 See Slotnick v. Staviskey, 560 F.2d 31, 33 (1st Cir. 1977) (“It has long been the law in 
this and other circuits that complaints cannot survive a motion to dismiss if they contain 
conclusory allegations of conspiracy but do not support their claims with references to 
material facts.”); accord Loubser v. Thacker, 440 F.3d 439, 443 (7th Cir. 2006); Walker v. 
Thompson, 288 F.3d 1005, 1007-08 (7th Cir. 2002); Boddie v. Schnieder, 105 F.3d 857, 862 
(2d Cir. 1997); Young v. Biggers, 938 F.2d 565, 569 (5th Cir. 1991); Powell v. Jarvis, 460 
F.2d 551, 553 (2d Cir. 1972); Fletcher v. Hook, 446 F.2d 14, 15-16 (3d Cir. 1971); Jackson v. 
Nelson, 405 F.2d 872, 874 (9th Cir. 1968); Powell v. Workmen’s Comp. Bd., 327 F.2d 131, 
137 (2d Cir. 1964).  See generally Brian Z. Tamanaha, The Realism of Judges Past and 
Present, 57 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 77 (2009) (outside the context of particular cases, judges 
generally concede readily the truth of the “realist” doctrine that they use their individual 
judgment and common sense, and “make law”). 
 81 Cooney v. Rossiter, 583 F.3d 967, 970 (7th Cir. 2009) (Posner, J.). 
 82 Twombly, 550 U.S. at 566-67 (holding “allegations of parallel conduct” inadequate to 
state a claim for antitrust conspiracy). 
 83 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). 
 84 Twombly, 550 U.S. at 566; see also Tam Travel, Inc. v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 583 F.3d 
896, 909 (6th Cir. 2009) (“[T]he plausibility of plaintiffs’ conspiracy claim [stemming from 
price cuts] is inversely correlated to the magnitude of defendants’ economic self-interest in 
making the cuts.”) (citing Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 
588 (1986) (summary judgment context)). 
 85 See Robert G. Bone, Twombly, Pleading Rules, and the Regulation of Court Access, 94 
IOWA L. REV. 873, 930 (2009) (arguing that different pleading standards for different kinds of 
 
15Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2012
814 CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 60:799 
 
The complexity of antitrust discovery was an important factor spurring the Court 
to “retire” the Conley pleading standard.86  Writing for the Court, Justice Souter 
spent two paragraphs on the high costs of discovery, and remarked that additional 
caution was called in very large cases, since litigation itself would be so expensive.87  
In a way, the spirit of Twombly reflects a growing sense that corporate litigation 
itself was absorbing too many national resources.88    
Antitrust was a perfect context for the court to affirm a stricter understanding of 
Rule 8(a)(2).89  In this context, the court could draw on the background circuit-court 
tradition of rejecting unsupported, conclusory allegations in conspiracy cases, while 
also looking to the future, which held the prospect that antitrust discovery would 
grow more expensive as corporations grew larger.90  Justice Souter noted that other 
procedural safeguards were already in place specifically for antitrust,91 because 
innocent parallel conduct so often resembled anticompetitive conspiracies:  hence, in 
a way, the holding of Twombly was simply that “an allegation of parallel conduct 
and a bare assertion of conspiracy will not suffice . . . in order to make a [Sherman 
                                                            
cases would allow for better screening of frivolous cases, “sensitive to the different reasons 
for meritless filings”); see also Tam Travel, 583 F.3d at 914 (Merritt, J., dissenting) 
(expressing dire concern that excessive application of Twombly in dissimilar cases is “slowly 
eviscerating antitrust enforcement under the Sherman Act,” leading to widening class 
inequality). 
 86 Twombly, 550 U.S. at 563. 
 87 Id. at 559 (observing that “plaintiffs represent a putative class of at least 90 percent of 
all subscribers to local telephone or high-speed Internet service in the continental United 
States, in an action against America’s largest telecommunications firms.”).  But see Edward D. 
Cavanagh, Twombly, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Courts, 82 ST. JOHN’S L. 
REV. 877, 882-89 (2008) (arguing that the Court underestimated the extent to which discovery 
can be managed to contain costs); Arthur Miller, From Conley to Twombly to Iqbal:  A 
Double Play on the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 60 DUKE L.J. 1, 64 (2010) (same). 
 88 See Saritha Komatireddy Tice, A “Plausible” Explanation of Pleading Standards, 31 
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 827, 830 (2008) (“[Twombly] reflects a significant shift away from 
the litigation-promoting mindset embodied in Conley and instead solidifies what has been a 
growing hostility toward litigation.”); see also id. at n.81 (citing Andrew M. Siegel, The Court 
Against the Courts: Hostility to Litigation as an Organizing Theme in the Rehnquist Court’s 
Jurisprudence, 84 TEX. L. REV. 1097, 1097 (2006)). 
 89 See also Baim & Blank, Inc. v. Warren-Connelly Co., 19 F.R.D. 108, 109 (S.D.N.Y. 
1956) (“The modern ‘notice’ theory of pleading is not sufficient when employed in a 
complaint under the anti-trust laws.”). 
 90 Cf. Hosp. Bldg. Co. v. Trs. of Rex Hosp., 425 U.S. 738, 746 (1976) (“[I]n antitrust 
cases, where ‘the proof is largely in the hands of the alleged conspirators,’ dismissals prior to 
giving the plaintiff ample opportunity for discovery should be granted very sparingly.” 
(quoting Poller v. Columbia Broad., 368 U.S. 464, 473 (1962) (in turn citing Conley, 355 U.S. 
at 45-46))). 
 91 Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556. 
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Act] § 1 claim.”92  It was not immediately clear whether the plausibility standard 
should even be applied outside the antitrust context.93 
B.  Iqbal Dismissals Prevent Litigation of Conspiracy Theories 
Two years later, in Iqbal, the Supreme Court made clear that it was not only for 
massive corporations that claims of liability must be found “plausible.”94  Again, 
however, the context was important:  the defendants were highly placed members of 
the executive branch of the U.S. government.  In such a context, the doctrine of 
qualified immunity reflects courts’ concern about subjecting defendants to the 
discovery process on the basis of an inadequately specific complaint.95  Qualified 
immunity is intended to protect public officials from the litigation process by 
allowing summary dismissal when the constitutional right allegedly violated was not 
clearly established, even if the plaintiff’s version of events is true.96  Like the 
Twombly context, this situation was a fitting one for a reinterpretation of the 
pleading standard:  both antitrust actions and citizen lawsuits against officials exact 
high perceived costs from defendants, regardless of their liability, and might be 
brought speculatively.97  In both scenarios, because the target is such a prominent 
one, courts feel an additional duty to observe the principle that “The issue is not 
                                                            
 92 Id. at 556-557; see also id. at 561 n.7 (“neither parallel conduct nor conscious 
parallelism, taken alone, raise[s] the necessary implication of conspiracy”).  
 93 See Jochum, supra note 24, at 511 (describing pre-Iqbal “discussion among scholars 
that [Twombly] was limited to the realm of antitrust cases”). 
 94 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 684 (2009) (rejecting plaintiff’s attempt to confine 
Twombly to the antitrust context: “[o]ur decision in Twombly expounded the pleading standard 
for ‘all civil actions’” (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555-56)). 
 95 Id. at 672 (qualified immunity is “both a defense to liability and a limited entitlement 
not to stand trial or face the other burdens of litigation” (citing Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 
511, 526 (1985))); see also Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226, 235-36 (Kennedy, J., concurring) 
(“There is tension between the rationale of Harlow [requiring qualified immunity 
determinations as early in a case as possible] and the requirement of malice, and it seems to 
me that the heightened pleading requirement is the most workable means to resolve it.”). 
 96 See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 685 (“Litigation, though necessary to ensure that officials comply 
with the law, exacts heavy costs in terms of efficiency and expenditure of valuable time and 
resources that might otherwise be directed to the proper execution of the work of the 
Government.”); see also Iqbal v. Hasty, 490 F.3d 143 (2d Cir. 2007) (Cabranes, J., 
concurring) (“The Supreme Court’s recognition in Bell Atlantic that ‘proceeding to . . . 
discovery can be expensive’ has particular resonance where, as here, discovery would not only 
result in significant cost but would also deplete the time and effectiveness of current officials 
and the personal resources of former officials.” (citing Twombly, 127 S. Ct. at 1967)); Sharratt 
v. Murtha, 437 F. App’x 167, 168, 170 (3d Cir. 2011) (citing Iqbal in dismissing on qualified 
immunity grounds lawsuits against former Congressman John Murtha “for statements Murtha 
had made to the press relating to Sharratt and other Marines’ culpability for the deaths of 
several Iraqis in 2005”). 
 97 See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 670 (central issue of case as balance between liberal pleading 
rules and “qualified immunity privilege rooted in the need to preserve the effectiveness of 
government as contemplated by our constitutional structure” (quoting Hasty, 490 F.3d at 178 
(Cabranes, J., concurring))). 
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whether plaintiff will prevail, but whether he is entitled to [develop and] offer 
evidence to support his claims.”98 
The plaintiff in the 2009 case, Javaida Iqbal, alleged religious and racial 
discrimination in the decision to place him under high-security conditions after his 
arrest on immigration charges in the wake of the September 11 attacks.99  He alleged 
that all Muslims arrested at that time pursuant to Federal Bureau of Investigations 
(FBI) investigations in the region were flagged as “high interest,” even without 
individuated suspicion of links to terrorism.100  The Supreme Court took judicial 
notice of a Department of Justice (DOJ) Inspector General’s report, indicating that in 
fact only 184 out of 762 of those arrested after FBI questioning had been flagged as 
“high interest” and subjected to harsh solitary confinement, as Iqbal had been.101  
While noting that the allegations of mistreatment by prison guards clearly stated a 
civil-rights claim,102 the Court went on to dismiss Iqbal’s complaint as to the cabinet-
level officials he accused of formulating and implementing discriminatory policies, 
because no such policies were needed to explain his injury.  The Court asserted, “[i]t 
should come as no surprise that a legitimate policy directing law enforcement to 
arrest and detain individuals because of their suspected link to the attacks would 
produce a disparate, incidental impact on Arab Muslims, even though the purpose of 
the policy was to target neither Arabs nor Muslims.”103  The Court set aside Iqbal’s 
allegations of discriminatory policy-making, noting that “the Federal Rules do not 
require courts to credit a complaint’s conclusory statements without reference to its 
factual context.”104  In such a scenario, when innocent conduct can explain bad 
outcomes, defendants with important jobs to do should be protected not just from 
liability but from the discovery process.105  The ruling expressly extended Twombly 
to all civil actions, and created ripple effects through the conduct of U.S. civil 
litigation.106 
                                                            
 98 United States v. Yale New Haven Hosp., 727 F. Supp. 784, 786 (D. Conn. 1990) (citing 
Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974)). 
 99 Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 666. 
 100 Id. at 669. 
 101 Id. at 667 (citing Inspector General’s report online “as visited May 14, 2009,” four days 
before issuance of the ruling, and “available in Clerk of Court’s case file”). 
 102 Id. at 682. 
 103 Id.; cf. Ramzi Kassem, Iqbal and Race: Implausible Realities: Iqbal’s Entrenchment of 
Majority Group Skepticism Towards Discrimination Claims, 114 PENN ST. L. REV. 1443, 
1474-75 (2010) (because plausibility is subjectively determined by judges often lacking 
minority perspective, “Iqbal raises the concern that Muslim and other minority plaintiffs 
asserting discrimination claims may fare poorly unless pleading standards are readjusted”). 
 104 Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 686. 
 105 See Iqbal v. Hasty, 490 F.3d 143, 152 (2d Cir. 2007) (“Qualified immunity is an 
immunity from suit and not just a defense to liability.” (citing Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 
200 (2001))). 
 106 See, e.g., Doe v. Bd. of Regents, 280 Neb. 492, 506 (Neb. 2010) (adopting 
Twombly/Iqbal standard as its own interpretation of NEB. CT. R. PLDG. § 6-1108(a)(2)).  But 
see Webb v. Nashville Area Habitat for Humanity, Inc., 346 S.W.3d 422, 431 (Tenn. 2011) 
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The procedural holdings of Twombly and Iqbal altered the ground rules for 
virtually all disputes in all federal courts, but they should be understood in context.  
The goal in each case was to protect preoccupied defendants from expensive 
factfinding:  conspiracy theorizing should not on its own open enormous corporate 
file vaults or overcome qualified immunity.  Twombly was about two corporate 
entities that made similar decisions, and whether there was any reason at all to 
suppose them collaborators.  Iqbal was about the policymakers John Ashcroft and 
Robert Mueller, and whether there was any reason at all to suppose they initiated 
Iqbal’s discriminatory treatment.  As the Eighth Circuit later explained, the gist of 
each ruling was simply that “[a]n inference pressed by the plaintiff is not plausible if 
the facts he points to are precisely the result one would expect from lawful conduct 
in which the defendant is known to have engaged.”107 
In each case, the Court believed a lawful explanation, much simpler than 
conspiracy, was more than enough to account for the plaintiff’s harm.108  
Corporations are by nature ruthless in competition; antiterrorism dragnets are by 
nature (according to the five-justice majority in Iqbal) liable to capture the innocent.  
A plaintiff’s misfortune does not imply a dastardly cause.  Plaintiffs who are, by the 
light of “judicial experience and common sense,”109 clearly just victims of 
circumstance should not be encouraged to waste social resources trying to prove 
policy wrongdoing—or allowed to extract settlements with onerous discovery 
requests.  Hence, the problem with each complaint was not really that it had 
disobeyed pleading rules, but that, for a majority of the Court, it disintegrated at 
even a touch of Occam’s Razor.110 
Iqbal and Twombly are true to their circuit-court roots in heightened pleading 
standards for conspiracy claims.111  Both rulings purport to dismiss conspiracy 
                                                            
(declining to apply Iqbal to state rules of civil procedure); Jochum, supra note 24, at 521-27 
(arguing that Ohio should not adopt the standard). 
 107 Braden v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 588 F.3d 585, 597 (8th Cir. 2009). 
 108 See also Swanson v. Citibank, N.A., 614 F.3d 400, 411 (7th Cir. 2010) (Posner, J., 
dissenting) (explaining the new pleading standard as part of the reason to uphold a dismissal:  
“[W]hen a bank turns down a loan applicant because the appraisal of the security for the loan 
indicates that the loan would not be adequately secured, the alternative hypothesis of racial 
discrimination does not have substantial merit; it is implausible”); cf. Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor 
Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 326 (2007) (holding that under the heightened “strong 
inference” pleading standards of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, a claim of 
fraudulent intent (scienter) was well pled if “a reasonable person [would] deem the inference 
of scienter at least as strong as any opposing inference”). 
 109 Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679 (citing Hasty, 490 F.3d. at 157-58). 
 110 Occam’s Razor is the principle that the simplest explanation will be the most plausible 
until evidence is presented to prove it false.  Cf. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 680 (explaining that 
allegation about defendants in Twombly was “not only compatible with, but indeed was more 
likely explained by, lawful, unchoreographed free-market behavior” (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. 
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 567 (2007))). 
 111 See Cooney v. Rossiter, 583 F.3d 967, 971 (7th Cir. 2009) (readily applying heightened 
Iqbal pleading standards, despite lack of antitrust or immunity issues, because instant case, 
involving plaintiff diagnosed with Munchausen syndrome by proxy, bore earmarks of 
“paranoid pro se litigation, arising out of a bitter custody fight and alleging, as it does, a vast, 
encompassing conspiracy”), cert. denied, 2010 U.S. LEXIS 4191 (May 24, 2010). 
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theorizing.112  To point out this policy context is not to question the decisions’ 
precedential value.  The Court certainly knew that it was altering how Federal Rule 
of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) would be interpreted in every court in every case in the 
country.113  Conspiracy theories had never been enough in conspiracy cases, and 
henceforth they would not be enough in any case.114  After Iqbal, the Court knew, 
entitlement to relief would have be “shown,” as Rule 8(a)(2) says, and not merely 
stated as a legal conclusion.  But the shared feature of these two cases—conspiracy 
claims—is instructive.  The Court’s agenda was not simply to heighten all pleading 
standards, regardless of their procedural context.115 
The Court said nothing in specific about altering pleading standards for 
statements of subject-matter jurisdiction.  Nonetheless, Twombly and Iqbal would be 
taken by many courts to alter the interpretation of Rule 8(a)(1) as well as Rule 
8(a)(2).  This extension of the doctrine, almost never explained, ignores the fact that 
(a)(1), unlike (a)(2), requires no “showing”—only a statement of the court’s 
jurisdiction—and the fact that jurisdiction is quite different from entitlement to 
relief.  And the reinterpretation is doubly strange in light of the Arbaugh line of 
cases in which the Court had striven to emphasize the distinction between 12(b)(1) 
and 12(b)(6) contexts.  Nonetheless, in part because of cross-references and habits 
that courts had developed for analyzing 12(b) motions, Iqbal is now being used to 
make plaintiffs’ jurisdictional statements, like their conspiracy theories, into objects 
of skepticism.   
III.  THE NATURE OF THE ERROR: JURISDICTIONAL PLEADING AND THE  
PLAUSIBILITY STANDARD 
Considerable attention has been paid to the question of whether Twombly and 
Iqbal “heightened pleading standards”:  the purpose of a complaint, since the middle 
of the twentieth century, had simply been to put the defendant on notice about its 
alleged wrongdoing, so the defendant would know what the suit was about.116  
                                                            
 112 See McCauley v. City of Chicago, No. 09-3561, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 21179, at *40 
(7th Cir. Oct. 20, 2011) (Hamilton, J., dissenting) (urging liberal grants of leave to amend 
complaints after Iqbal, because “[i]mplausible pleadings do harm primarily by failing to 
ground themselves sufficiently in reality such that defendants can know what is claimed”).  
The opportunity to amend a facially implausible complaint allows plaintiffs with reasonable 
theories of official wrongdoing to distinguish themselves from conspiracy theorists. 
 113 See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 579 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (bemoaning the Court’s choice to 
“rewrite the nation’s civil procedure textbooks”). 
 114 Compare Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 683 (noting that once theorizing was set aside, the “only 
factual allegation against petitioners accuses them of adopting a policy approving restrictive 
conditions of confinement for . . . suspected terrorists,” and not of any wrongdoing), with 
Collins v. Miller, 338 F. App’x. 34, 35 (2d Cir. 2009) (summary order affirming dismissal of 
habeas petition that alleged due process violation, because plaintiff “has not plausibly pleaded 
that secret in-chambers proceedings . . . actually occurred,” and because court docket showed 
no proceedings on date in question). 
 115 Accord Bone, supra note 85, at 890 (placing Twombly in its factual context to argue that 
generalized “aggressive screening through stiff pleading is not what the Supreme Court 
intended”). 
 116 See Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 512-13 (2002) (reaffirming liberal 
“notice pleading” standard); Leatherman v. Tarrant Cnty. Narcotics Intelligence & 
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Perhaps, after Twombly, this was no longer the point of a complaint, and perhaps 
plaintiffs needed to engage in “pre-discovery” on their own to sleuth out extra facts 
to make their case seem substantial and “plausible” on the face of the pleadings.  It is 
now generally understood that this interpretation is wrong.117  The court must still 
assume that concrete facts and sensible inferences118 are true.  
The Court took care to forestall misunderstanding of the plausibility standard by 
issuing a strong reaffirmation of notice pleading just a few weeks after Twombly, in 
Erickson v. Pardus.119  There, a prisoner’s allegations about denial of medical 
treatment were held to be ample even without specifics, and the Court deplored the 
Tenth Circuit’s “departure from the liberal pleading standards set forth by Rule 
8(a)(2).”120  Most courts carefully noted the juxtaposition of the two cases121 and 
strove to understand the elusive distinction between plausibility and proof—the first 
now required under Twombly, and the second still not required.122  As a result few 
courts require abundant detail in allegations in the 12(b)(6) context, and Twombly 
has been received as the Supreme Court intended.123  In another area, however, the 
effects of these watershed cases were not so carefully managed.  
A.  How Iqbal is Misread to Alter Jurisdictional Pleading Standards 
Even though they touched on matters of corporate accountability to law and of 
fundamental civil rights, the Twombly and Iqbal rulings hinged on their close 
reading of one of the clauses of Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.  
Justice Souter, in Iqbal, was reinterpreting only Rule 8(a)(2):  the requirement of 
plausibility, he wrote, stemmed directly from the “the threshold requirement of Rule 
                                                            
Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 168 (1993) (same).  See generally Peter Julian, Note, 
Charles E. Clark and Simple Pleading:  Against a “Formalism of Generality,” 104 NW. U. L. 
REV. 1179 (arguing that Twombly and Iqbal are true to the doctrinal balance of rigidity and 
flexibility advocated by the principal architect of the Federal Rules). 
 117 See, e.g., Arista Records LLC v. Doe, 604 F.3d 110, 119 (2d Cir. 2010) (rejecting the 
notion that “Twombly imposed a heightened standard that requires a complaint to include 
specific evidence, factual allegations in addition to those required by Rule 8, [or] declarations 
from the persons who collected the evidence”). 
 118 See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 696 (Souter, J., dissenting) (explaining the ruling in Twombly and 
the level of implausibility—“claims about little green men”—that should trigger dismissal). 
 119 Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007) (per curiam) (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 
8(a)(2)). 
 120 Id. at 94. 
 121 See Jochum, supra note 24, at 509-10 (proposing that the Court in Erickson “wished to 
strategically reinforce that notice pleading under Conley had not been eliminated”). 
 122 See also Hamilton v. Palm, 621 F.3d 816, 818 (8th Cir. 2010) (following Arbaugh, 
albeit without citing it, to consider under 12(b)(6) “how the general principles of Twombly and 
Iqbal apply to the pleading of . . . whether a party was an employee,” and holding the 
allegation of employee status sufficient). 
 123 See Patricia W. Hatamyar, The Tao of Pleading:  Do Twombly and Iqbal Matter 
Empirically?, 59 AM. U. L. REV. 553, 556 (finding that through August 2009 “the rate at 
which [12(b)(6)] motions were granted increased from Conley to Twombly to Iqbal, although 
grants with leave to amend accounted for much of the increase”). 
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8(a)(2) that the ‘plain statement’ possess enough heft to ‘sho[w] that the pleader is 
entitled to relief.’”124  In like fashion, Justice Kennedy held in Iqbal that when a 
complaint offers only legal conclusions, with the defendant’s name inserted, “the 
complaint has alleged—but it has not ‘show[n]’—‘that the pleader is entitled to 
relief.’”125  Both justices emphasize that 8(a)(2) requires some factual predicate, to 
enable the complaint to “show” the basis for relief.  But Rule 8(a)(1), unlike Rule 
8(a)(2), does not require such a “showing”—only a “clear and plain statement of the 
grounds for the court’s jurisdiction.”126  On the face of the law, then, Twombly and 
Iqbal do not apply to jurisdictional challenges under Rule 12(b)(1).127 
Both rulings ground their analysis in Rule 8(a)(2), and Justice Souter, in 
Twombly, was careful to limit the effect of the opinion’s reasoning to Rule 12(b)(6):  
the issue was narrowly whether a claim had been stated against Bell Atlantic.  In 
Iqbal, however, Justice Kennedy in one place omitted the key qualifier:  “To survive 
a motion to dismiss [sic], a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, 
accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”128  These 
words were quoted by federal courts 1,853 times in 2010 alone, and 2,475 times in 
                                                            
 124 Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 557 (2007) (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2)). 
 125 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009) (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2)). 
 126 FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(1) (emphasis added).   
 127 But see FED. R. CIV. P. 9(a)(1) (“Except when required to show that the court has 
jurisdiction, a pleading need not allege a party’s capacity to sue or be sued; a party’s authority 
to sue or be sued in a representative capacity; or the legal existence of an organized 
association of persons that is made a party.”) (emphasis added).  Although it contains the word 
“show,” Rule 9(a)(1) has been construed to mean simply that in the narrow class of cases in 
which jurisdiction is implicated by the “capacity” in which parties appear, plaintiffs must state 
the proper role for each party in the litigation.  See Wells v. Brown, 891 F.2d 591, 594 (6th 
Cir. 1989) (dismissing suit because complaint failed to specify that it was against state official 
“in personal capacity,” to satisfy the jurisdictional requirement of 42 U.S.C. § 1983), 
overruled, Moore v. City of Harriman, 272 F.3d 769, 774 (6th Cir. 2001) (en banc) (capacity 
can be determined from any part of the course of proceedings that puts the defendant on 
notice, and even a response to a motion to dismiss can “clarify any remaining ambiguity”).   
The requirement to state each party’s capacity is enforced only loosely; indeed, the Supreme 
Court brushed the issue aside even in a case in which subject-matter jurisdiction was in 
question and the complaint was defective.  Compare Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 24 (1991) 
(“Because this issue is not properly before us, we simply reiterate the Third Circuit’s view that 
it is obviously preferable for the plaintiff to be specific in the first instance to avoid any 
ambiguity.”) (internal quotation marks omitted), with Kontrick v. Ryan, 540 U.S. 443, 455 
(2004) (Supreme Court should raise sua sponte any possible deficiency in subject-matter 
jurisdiction (quoting Mansfield, C. & L. M. R. Co. v. Swan, 111 U.S. 379, 382 (1884)). 
Nonetheless, on the face of the Rules it is arguable that Iqbal should apply in such cases.  See, 
e.g., Local 153 Health Fund v. Express Scripts, Inc., No. 4:05-cv-00862, 2007 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 90470, at *27 (E.D. Mo. Dec. 7, 2007) (six months after Twombly, threatening to 
dismiss ERISA action for lack of jurisdiction in light of Rule 9(a)(1) because “aside from the 
unsubstantiated statement that Plaintiff is a trustee, Plaintiff’s complaint does not allege any 
facts to establish its status as a fiduciary” to satisfy jurisdictional requirement of 29 U.S.C. § 
1132(a)—but granting two weeks to amend the complaint and add a fiduciary party). 
 128 Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (internal quotations and citation omitted). 
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2011.129  Although the sentence includes the phrase “state a claim,” its first phrase 
seems to suggest that it should apply to any motion to dismiss.  Courts have not been 
slow to read it that way.  Indeed the sentence has often been quoted in contexts 
unrelated to the adequacy of the pleadings under Rules 8(a)(2) and 12(b)(6).130  Only 
a few highly attentive courts have properly doctored the sentence’s opening phrase 
to make it precise.131  
Even without this misleading sentence, lower federal courts were highly likely to 
apply Iqbal in the context of 12(b)(1) motions, because over the years many courts 
had gotten used to invoking 8(a)(2) standards to define 8(a)(1) standards.  This 
equation made sense, despite the teaching of Bell, because the mechanical 
requirements and assumptions in handling facts for the two motions were the same.  
The assertion was embedded in the boilerplate language of countless federal courts:  
“The standards applied to a [facial] Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss are the same as 
those that apply to a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim.”132  
This statement—though it appears in various forms in countless binding circuit 
precedents—is no longer true.   
Twombly and Iqbal created a split between the threshold for factual grounding 
for a well-stated claim under Rule 8(a)(2) and the (unchanged) threshold for a 
                                                            
 129 Lexis search of federal-court rulings for first thirteen words of quoted language (search 
conducted Jan. 10, 2012). 
 130 In fact this sentence has been cited in virtually every conceivable Rule 12 context.  See 
Cisco Sys. v. United States, No. 04-135, 2011 Ct. Intl. Trade LEXIS 141, at **5 (Ct. Int’l 
Trade Nov. 18, 2011) (quoting the sentence in a judgment on the pleadings for lack of 
jurisdiction, Rules 12(c) and 8(a)(1)); White v. Green, 382 F. App’x 199, 201 (3d Cir. 2010) 
(per curiam) (quoting the sentence in affirming grant of motion to dismiss for insufficient 
service of process, Rule 12(b)(5)); Alperin v. Vatican Bank, 360 Fed. App’x 847, 849 (9th 
Cir. 2009) (in affirming dismissal due to the jurisdictional bar of the Foreign Sovereign 
Immunity Act, Rule 12(b)(1)); Vivendi SA v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., 586 F.3d 689, 694 (9th 
Cir. 2009) (in affirming dismissal on grounds of forum non conveniens, Rule 12(b)(3)); 
Kaplan v. Evans, No. 4:11-CV-00153, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 147227, at *2 (E.D. Mo. Dec. 
22, 2011) (in dismissing RICO claims for failure to allege fraud with particularity under the 
special pleading requirements of Rule 9(b), Rule 12(b)(6)); see also Acute Care Specialists II, 
Ltd. v. United States, No. 11-C-465, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 144155, at *13 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 14, 
2011) (applying Iqbal in evaluating status of parties to determine that the court “lacks subject 
matter jurisdiction” due to jurisdictional requirements for tax claims, Rule 12(b)(1)); 
Risktimetry Analytics, LLC v. Altaira, LLC, 752 F. Supp. 2d 141, 142 (D. Mass. 2010) 
(applying Iqbal in considering motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, Rule 
12(b)(2)).   
 131 See, e.g., Fournerat v. Wis. Law Review, 420 F. App’x 816, 819 (10th Cir. 2011) (“To 
survive a motion to dismiss [under Rule 12(b)(6)], a complaint must contain sufficient factual 
matter . . . .” (brackets in original) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678)); Van Tassel v. Lawrence 
Cnty. Domestic Relations Section, 659 F. Supp. 2d 672, 687 (W.D. Pa. 2009) (same). 
 132 E.g., Bishop v. Crawford, No. 1:11-CV-11, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 137227, at *4-5 
(E.D. Mo. Nov. 30, 2011) (citing Vankempen v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 923 F. Supp. 146, 
147 (E.D. Mo. 1996) (in turn citing Satz v. ITT Fin. Corp., 619 F.2d 738, 742 (8th Cir. 
1980))); see also, e.g., Tucker v. Am. Int’l Grp., 745 F. Supp. 2d 53, 57 (D. Conn. 2010) 
(“The standards for dismissal under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) are ‘substantively 
identical.’”) (quoting Kroposki v. Fed. Aviation Admin., No. 08-CV-01519, 2009 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 76084, at *3 (D. Conn. Aug. 26, 2009) (in turn citing Lerner v. Fleet Bank, N.A., 318 
F.3d 113, 138 (2d Cir. 2003))). 
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statement of jurisdiction under Rule 8(a)(1).133  In the context of a challenge to the 
legal (i.e., facial) adequacy of a jurisdictional statement, the Federal Rules continue 
to require, as before, total deference to the facts as alleged in the complaint.134  
Erroneously, though, lower courts have taken to applying the “plausibility” standard 
to such facts. 
B.  Plausibility Standards Are Unnecessary for the 12(b)(1) Motion 
The facial 12(b)(1) ruling traditionally required total credulity of the judge in 
reading the complaint’s facts; in this it always resembled the 12(b)(6) ruling.  Now, 
though, judges must require the complaint in 12(b)(6) analyses to be plausible.  It 
might seem sensible to require the same in evaluating jurisdiction.  It might be 
argued, indeed, that total deference to plaintiff’s version of the facts is less, not 
more, appropriate when jurisdiction is at stake.  After all, a court that wrongly 
assumes jurisdiction over a case commits a more significant error than one that 
allows discovery in a lawsuit of dubious substantive merit.  But standard procedural 
doctrine already allows a defendant—or a court itself—to contest the factual 
predicate of the basis for jurisdiction, and to call for discovery on that issue alone, as 
a question of fact.135   
Courts have, indeed, consistently recognized that there are two kinds of 12(b)(1) 
motions to dismiss:  the “facial” and the “factual” challenges.136  A plaintiff has 
always been given the benefit of any factual doubt in the former case, when a 
12(b)(1) motion challenges the plaintiff’s legal understanding of the situation.  In the 
latter case, however, when the truth of the predicate facts is questioned, the court 
resolves the factual dispute, calling for a limited form of discovery, and satisfies 
                                                            
 133 See Shepherd, supra note 8, at 2329-30 (“Although a Rule 12(b)(1) facial attack and a 
Rule 12(b)(6) challenge to the claim have similar procedural requirements, this similarity does 
not dictate the wholesale importation of the Rule 12(b)(6) standard into the Rule 12(b)(1) 
context.”).  But cf. S.I. Strong, Jurisdictional Discovery in United States Federal Courts, 67 
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 489, 569 (2010) (arguing in favor of “extending the plausibility 
standard to include jurisdictional facts under Rule 8(a)(1) and then applying that standard to 
motions to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1) or 12(b)(2)”). 
 134 This deference does not excuse plaintiffs from stating a prima facie case for personal 
and subject-matter jurisdiction.  See, e.g., RSM Prod. Corp. v. Fridman, 643 F. Supp. 2d 382, 
402 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (“Plaintiffs’ ‘expectation’ that discovery will uncover additional 
evidence of Browne’s general contacts with New York as well as of Browne’s New York-
based acts with respect to the alleged conspiracy, is, in fact, an ‘unfounded fishing 
expedition,’ and does not adequately support its request for jurisdictional discovery.” 
(citations omitted)); see also id. at 393-94 (distinguishing standards of review for 
jurisdictional challenges from Twombly standard for 12(b)(6) motion). 
 135 See, e.g., LeBlanc v. Cleveland, 198 F.3d 353, 356 (2d Cir. 1999) (“[W]here 
jurisdictional facts are placed in dispute, the court has the power and obligation to decide 
issues of fact by reference to evidence outside the pleadings.”). 
 136 See, e.g., Ohio Nat’l Life Ins. Co. v. United States, 922 F.2d 320, 325 (6th Cir. 1990) 
(explaining the two types of 12(b)(1) motions); Williamson v. Tucker, 645 F.2d 404, 413 (5th 
Cir. 1981) (“The district court . . . has the power to dismiss for lack of subject matter 
jurisdiction on any one of three separate bases: (1) the complaint alone; (2) the complaint 
supplemented by undisputed facts evidenced in the record; or (3) the complaint supplemented 
by undisputed facts plus the court’s resolution of disputed facts.” (emphasis added)). 
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itself that the realities of the situation actually create jurisdiction. 137  With notable 
exceptions,138 Iqbal has not altered courts’ approach to classic factual challenges to 
jurisdiction. 
The facial 12(b)(1) challenge, like the traditional 12(b)(6) challenge, simply calls 
into question the adequacy of the pleadings.  It is this challenge that has traditionally 
been described as affording the plaintiff the same procedural safeguards as the 
12(b)(6) motion.  Using that old description, many courts since Iqbal have begun 
applying its reinterpreted 12(b)(6) standard to facial jurisdiction challenges.  Such 
application defies the teaching of Bell and Arbaugh that Rules 8(a)(1) and 8(a)(2) 
serve different purposes and set different kinds of requirements.  At some point it 
will become necessary for the Court to prevent further erosion in lower courts’ 
handling of the doctrine by clarifying that Iqbal does not apply to the 12(b)(1) 
motion.  The error is both an effect and a cause of a threatened erosion of the 
jurisdiction/merits doctrine in lower courts.  When this erosion began, improved 
understanding of that doctrine had continued to filter into the lower courts since 
Arbaugh.139  More importantly, however, the same doctrine has been followed 
through at the Supreme Court level.   
C.  Iqbal Did Not Alter the Supreme Court’s Insistence on Leniency in Deciding 
Subject-Matter Jurisdiction 
Since jurisdictional and merits issues are sometimes intertwined, it might be 
questioned whether application of Iqbal to 12(b)(1) motions is in fact an error at 
all.140  It is certainly possible, despite the focus on Rule 8(a)(2) in Twombly, that in 
2007 and 2009 the Supreme Court in fact intended to make subject-matter 
jurisdiction harder to establish under Rule 8(a)(1), hence mandating reading of 
complaints that are generally more skeptical.141  This would mean that Iqbal should 
                                                            
 137 See generally Kevin M. Clermont, Jurisdictional Fact, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 973, 975 
(describing and justifying “a lower standard of proof [that] prevails for jurisdictional 
purposes” on any question of fact that overlaps merits and jurisdiction). See also Strong, supra 
note 133, 497-508, 523-33. 
 138 See discussion of Animal Sci. Prods., infra note 174-78 and accompanying text. 
 139  See, e.g., Ayyash v. Bank Al-Madina, No. 04-cv-9201, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9677, at 
*11 n.2 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 9, 2006) (noting “significant consequences” that can result from the 
error in categorization, and remarking that “the Supreme Court’s decision in Arbaugh may 
require that the Court of Appeals review its treatment of the question of RICO’s 
extraterritorial effect”); id. at *19 (ordering jurisdictional discovery).  For an admirably 
precise and succinct statement of the correct standards for jurisdictional challenges after Iqbal, 
see Arocho v. Nafzinger, No. 07-cv-02603, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11673, at *4-5 (D. Colo. 
Jan. 14, 2009) (personal jurisdiction analysis should have included official acts), rev’d on 
other grounds, 367 F. App’x 942, 948-49. 
 140 Cf. Jayne S. Ressler, Plausibly Pleading Personal Jurisdiction, 82 TEMP. L. REV. 627, 
630 (applying the “insights of Twombly . . . to the vexing problem of personal jurisdiction,” 
Rule 12(b)(2)). 
 141 See also United States ex rel. Miller v. Bill Harbert Int’l Constr., Inc., 608 F.3d 871, 882 
(D.C. Cir. 2010) (applying Iqbal to the amendment of a complaint, to determine whether its 
allegations should be allowed to “relate back” under Fed. R. Civ. P. Rule 15(c)), cert. denied 
sub nom. Bill Harbert Int’l Constr., Inc. v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2443, 2443 (2011); Junk 
v. Terminix Int’l Co., Ltd. P’ship., 628 F.3d 439, 445 (8th Cir. 2010) (determining that the 
Iqbal standard should not be applied to determinations of fraudulent joinder under Fed. R. 
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in fact be read to encourage courts to grant 12(b)(1) as well as 12(b)(6) motions.  A 
landmark case from 2010, however, reaffirmed the two key holdings of the Arbaugh 
line of cases:  that jurisdiction and merits are very different things, and that 
jurisdiction should be accepted regardless of the quality of the complaint’s non-
frivolous factual allegations. 
The issue in Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd. was whether U.S. securities fraud 
laws applied to foreign conduct by a foreign-owned company.  The plaintiffs were 
foreign investors, but they claimed the fraud had been carried out by acts within the 
United States.142  In a factual challenge under Rule 12(b)(1), the defendants had 
contended that there was not enough U.S. subject matter to invoke the court’s 
jurisdiction.143  The appeals court had followed the Second Circuit’s well-respected 
jurisprudence on securities fraud issues, and accordingly dismissed the case for lack 
of subject-matter jurisdiction.144  The Supreme Court, in a straightforward first 
section to its ruling, corrected this “threshold” procedural error and added Morrison 
to the line of cases reversing deplorable “drive-by jurisdictional rulings.”145  Justice 
Scalia explained that jurisdiction should not have been the issue: “to ask what 
conduct § 10(b) reaches is to ask what conduct § 10(b) prohibits, which is a merits 
question.”146  This meant that the analysis should have been conducted under Rule 
12(b)(6), requiring the plaintiffs to allege enough facts to invoke the securities-fraud 
laws.147  The complaint was factually adequate, but the Court interpreted the statute 
to hold that it did not apply in such cases, and hence dismissed the case for failure 
“to state a claim on which relief can be granted.”148  As in the pre-Iqbal line of cases, 
therefore, the Court was at pains to emphasize the distinct nature of the two key 
                                                            
Civ. Proc. Rule 20), cert. denied sub nom. Breneman v. Junk, 132 S. Ct. 95, 95 (2011); Nathan 
Leber, Solving a Pleading Plague: Why Federal Courts Should Strike Insufficient Affirmative 
Defenses Under the Twombly-Iqbal Plausibility Standard, 61 CLEV. ST. L. REV.  (forthcoming 
2013). 
 142 Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2876 (2010). 
 143 See In re Nat’l Austl. Bank Sec. Litig., No. 03-Civ.-6537, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
94162, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 25, 2006) (district court specifying that challenge was factual and 
that the court could consider matters outside the pleadings). 
 144 Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 547 F.3d 167, 173 (2d Cir. 2008) (analyzing 
jurisdiction under the “‘conduct test’: identify which action or actions constituted the fraud 
and directly caused harm . . . and then determine if that act or those actions emanated from the 
United States” (citing IIT v. Vencap, Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001, 1017 (2d Cir. 1975))); cf. Romero v 
Int’l Terminal Oper. Co., 358 U.S. 354, 393-94 (1959) (holding extraterritorial reach of statute 
a question of statutory interpretation, and not of the Court’s jurisdiction); Lauritzen v. Larsen, 
345 U.S. 571, 577-79 (1953) (same). 
 145 See Elizabeth Cosenza, Paradise Lost: § 10(b) after Morrison v. National Australia 
Bank, 11 CHI. J. INT’L L. 343, 368 (2011) (“[T]he distinction between subject matter 
jurisdiction and the ingredient of the claim is among the reasons the Supreme Court granted 
certiorari in the National Australia Bank case.”). 
 146 Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2877. 
 147 Cf. Castiglione v. Papa, 423 F. App’x 10, 12 (2d Cir. 2011) (wrongly identifying 
Morrison as “involving a 12(b)(1) motion” and then incorporating Iqbal plausibility 
requirements into the description of the standard of review for such motions). 
 148 Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2888 (invoking Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6)). 
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constituents of the complaint—jurisdiction on the one hand, and adequacy of the 
claim on the other.  Morrison was a resounding reaffirmation of Arbaugh, and a 
clear signal from the court, again, that 12(b)(1) motions deal with different types of 
question from 12(b)(6) motions.  As Morrison shows, the Court has held steadily 
after Iqbal to the reasoning of Arbaugh.149  In many cases, too, lower courts continue 
to follow this lead.150  Morrison, and the other cases distinguishing merits from 
                                                            
 149 See also Henderson v. Shinseki, 131 S. Ct. 1197, 1202 (2011) (“Because the 
consequences that attach to the jurisdictional label may be so drastic, we have tried in recent 
cases to bring some discipline to the use of this term.”); Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick, 130 
S. Ct. 1237, 1244 (2010) (“Our recent cases evince a marked desire to curtail such ‘drive-by 
jurisdictional rulings,’ which too easily can miss the ‘critical difference[s]’ between true 
jurisdictional conditions and nonjurisdictional limitations on causes of action.” (citation 
omitted) (quoting Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 91 (1998), and 
Kontrick v. Ryan, 540 U.S. 443, 456 (2004))). 
The court’s zeal for preventing drive-by jurisdictional rulings has reached a fever pitch:  In 
2012, the Court interposed a footnote in the landmark case confirming the existence of a 
“ministerial exception” preventing certain employment-discrimination claims against religious 
organizations.  Hosanna-Tabor Evang. Lutheran Church & Sch. v. Equal Emp’t Opportunity 
Comm’n, 132 S. Ct. 694, 714 n.4 (2012).  The footnote resolved a “conflict [that] has arisen in 
the Courts of Appeals over whether the ministerial exception is a jurisdictional bar or a 
defense on the merits . . . . We conclude that the exception operates as an affirmative defense 
to an otherwise cognizable claim, not a jurisdictional bar.”  Id. (citing Morrison, 130 S. Ct. 
2869 at 2877); accord Howard M. Wasserman, Prescriptive Jurisdiction, Adjudicative 
Jurisdiction, and the Ministerial Exemption, 160 U. PA. L. REV. PENNUMBRA 287, 295 
(2012), available at http://www.pennumbra.com/essays/02-2012/Wasserman.pdf (seeking to 
“unpack why the exemption is, in fact, a merits doctrine”). Contra Gregory A. Kalscheur, 
Civil Procedure and the Establishment Clause:  Exploring the Ministerial Exception, Subject-
Matter Jurisdiction, and the Freedom of the Church, 17 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 43, 69-81 
(distinguishing Arbaugh and arguing that the bar should be jurisdictional, because the 
Constitution’s constraints on court power—not the statute—place decisions about ministerial 
employment “beyond the reach of the law” (citing Rayburn v. Gen. Conf. of Seventh-Day 
Adventists, 772 F.2d 1164, 1171 (4th Cir. 1985))).   
This result suggests that fact-intensive ministerial-exception inquiries will now probably be 
handled in the summary-judgment context, since unlike in factual 12(b)(1) challenges, 
12(b)(6) procedures constrain courts from looking outside the complaint.  To reach that stage, 
plaintiffs will need to satisfy Iqbal by pleading facts in the complaint plausibly showing their 
non-ministerial status. 
The Court’s explanation in Hosanna-Tabor was perplexing, since it should have been true 
regardless of whether 12(b)(1) or 12(b)(6) was implicated:  “District courts have power . . . to 
decide whether the claim can proceed or is instead barred by the ministerial exception.”  
Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 714 n.4.  This observation does not eliminate the possibility of a 
jurisdictional bar, since it is axiomatic that any court has the power to decide in the first 
instance whether it has jurisdiction or not.   
 150 See, e.g., Jahn v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., No. 10-1364, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 144412, 
at *31 (D.D.C. Dec. 15, 2011) (dismissing inadequately stated claim under Iqbal standard, and 
separately dismissing under traditional “notice pleading” standard claims barred for lack of 
subject-matter jurisdiction due to failure to exhaust administrative remedies); Pittsburgh Mack 
Sales & Serv., Inc. v. Int’l Union of Operating Eng’rs, 580 F.3d 185, 189 (3d Cir. 2009) (“the 
existence of a union contract is not a jurisdictional requirement” under the Labor Management 
Relations Act). 
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jurisdictional determinations, suggest that the plaintiff confronted with a facial 
12(b)(1) motion has kept all those safeguards, even though Iqbal now denies them to 
a plaintiff confronting a 12(b)(6) motion.  
After Iqbal, then, a challenge to the facts in a complaint can be correctly 
adjudicated in one of three ways.   Consider the crude hypothetical of a cruise-ship 
passenger alleging in federal court that he suffered emotional distress intentionally 
inflicted by a crew-member’s actions while officiating a shuffleboard game in 
American territorial waters.  The defendant may move for dismissal on the basis that 
tort law is preempted on cruise ships by a Congressionally mandated regime of 
shuffleboard-dispute arbitration:  this would be a facial 12(b)(1) challenge, and 
despite Iqbal no plausibility in the factual pleadings is required.  The defendant 
might, however, contend that the story told in the complaint is far more plausibly 
explained by unintentional conduct, and that the lawsuit fails to achieve plausibility 
as a matter of law.  This argument would call for analysis of the complaint under the 
Iqbal standard, taking the plaintiff’s version of events as true but ignoring 
conclusory legal assertions.151  Or yet again, the defendant may argue that the ship 
was several miles farther out to sea than the plaintiff claims, and that as a factual 
matter, the court lacks jurisdiction.152  In this latter case, a factual 12(b)(1) challenge, 
the court would require discovery to be taken on the factual question of the ship’s 
location, and accord no presumption of truth to the plaintiff’s allegations about 
latitude and longitude.  This three-tiered scheme serves the two distinct rationales of 
the jurisdiction and merits dismissal motions, while also retaining the principle that 
the court must satisfy itself as to its jurisdiction if predicate facts are disputed. 
A typical appearance of the Iqbal 12(b)(1) error, harmless in its context, occurs 
in a Tenth Circuit ruling on Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity in 2010:  the 
issue, in light of the constitutional constraint on federal courts’ jurisdiction over state 
governments, was whether the Oklahoma Tax Commission and its officials could be 
sued.  Their defense of sovereign immunity (unlike the qualified immunity at issue 
in Iqbal) called into question the court’s subject-matter jurisdiction—its power to 
hear the case.  The court, as many decades of precedent suggested, noted that since 
the challenge was a facial, not a factual one, “we apply the same standards under 
Rule 12(b)(1) that are applicable to a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to 
state a cause of action.”153  As it happened, it did not need to do so:  the plaintiffs’ 
                                                            
 151 See, e.g., Lobegeiger v. Celebrity Cruises, Inc., No. 11-21620, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
93933, at *55 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 23, 2011) (applying Iqbal in tort suit under admiralty law, and 
dismissing claim for gross negligence because “the Complaint does not contain any factual 
allegations indicating Anderson Teak was aware the Brianna Sun Lounger presented an 
increased risk of injury”). 
 152 But see Friedman v. Cunard Line Ltd., 996 F. Supp. 303, 307 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (holding 
that admiralty jurisdiction, and federal common law, are available on the high seas as long as 
there is a nexus with U.S. maritime commerce (citing East River Steamship Corp. v. 
Transamerica Delaval Inc., 476 U.S. 858, 864-65 (1986))); Coastal Fuels Mktg., Inc. v. Fla. 
Express Shipping Co., 207 F.3d 1247, 1251 (11th Cir. 2000) (“[W]hen neither statutory nor 
judicially created maritime principles provide an answer to a specific legal question, courts 
may apply state law provided that the application of state law does not frustrate national 
interests in having uniformity in admiralty law.”). 
 153 Muscogee Nation v. Okla. Tax Comm’n, 611 F.3d 1222, 1227 n.1 (10th Cir. 2010); 
accord Waters v. Fed. Bureau of Investigation, No. 11-cv-17, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 44972, 
at *2-3 (S.D. Ohio Apr. 26, 2011) (in facial 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss based on sovereign 
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theories about overcoming sovereign immunity were legally inadequate rather than 
implausible.154  Later, though, citing Iqbal, the opinion concluded on a 12(b)(6) issue 
that the tribe had failed to state a “plausible” claim.155  It would be easy for a lower 
court reading the opinion to deduce that insufficiently pled factual allegations as to 
jurisdiction should be governed by Iqbal. 
By contrast, a Colorado court in 2011 was careful in deciding a sovereign-
immunity issue to distinguish between subject-matter jurisdiction over the case and 
the legal sufficiency of the case.156  The court declined to apply Iqbal: 
Defendants explain that their motion to dismiss contends that Plaintiff has 
failed to plausibly plead his claims, and they argue that they are entitled to 
sovereign immunity from claims that are not plausibly pled . . . .  
Defendants confuse the information that Plaintiff must plead [under Rule 
8(a)(1)] to establish their waiver of sovereign immunity with respect to 
the type of claims he is asserting with the information that Plaintiff must 
plead [under Rule 8(a)(2)] to establish that his specific claims are facially 
plausible.157 
The first kind of “pleading information” is relevant to 12(b)(1) motions, the 
second to 12(b)(6) motions.  Treating these types of factual allegations in the same 
way, the court explained, would entangle jurisdictional questions with the 
substantive plausibility analysis:  “The fact that Defendants believe that Plaintiff’s 
claims are facially implausible does not implicate the doctrine of sovereign 
immunity or the Court’s jurisdiction over the claims.”158  This opinion’s echoes of 
Bell v. Hood and Steel Company show that this reasoning is in line with longstanding 
Supreme Court precedent on the generous standard for statements of jurisdiction, 
and the fact that that determination is distinct from the standard for statement of an 
adequate claim.159  Those cases teach that courts should not automatically apply 
Iqbal to issues of subject-matter jurisdiction. 
                                                            
immunity, “the Court applies the same standard applicable to Rule 12(b)(6) motions” (citing 
Ohio Nat’l Life Ins. Co. v. United States, 922 F.2d 320, 325 (6th Cir. 1990) and Bell Atl. 
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). 
 154 Muscogee, 611 F.3d at 1232 (holding Eleventh Amendment jurisdictional analysis for a 
suit against state officials requires only a “straightforward inquiry into whether the complaint 
alleges an ongoing violation of federal law and seeks relief properly characterized as 
prospective” rather than plausibility) (quoting Verizon Md. Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 535 
U.S. 635, 645 (2002)). 
 155 Id. at 1237 (specifying allegations that would have made the complaint adequate). 
 156 Sattar v. Holder, No. 07-cv-02698, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 63623, at *5-6 (D. Colo. 
June 16, 2011) (refusing to dismiss facially implausible claim for lack of subject-matter 
jurisdiction). 
 157 Id. at *2-6 (citing Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677-78 (2009)). 
 158 Id. at *7; cf. Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 89 (1998) (“[T]he 
absence of a valid (as opposed to arguable) cause of action does not implicate subject-matter 
jurisdiction, i.e., the courts’ statutory or constitutional power to adjudicate the case.”). 
 159 Compare Sattar, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 63623, at *7 (“[I]t is not improper for the 
Court to determine at the outset of a case that it has subject-matter jurisdiction over a claim 
that appears very likely to fail on its merits.”), with Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 682 (1946) 
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D.  Plausibility Standards are Unnecessary for the Facial 12(b)(1) Motion 
The approach taken by the Sattar court, distinguishing Iqbal contexts from 
jurisdictional contexts, was adopted by the Ninth Circuit in September, 2011, in 
Maya v. Centex Corp.  Addressing a question about a plaintiff’s standing, the circuit 
court rejected the defendant’s attempt to apply plausibility analysis:  “[rather than 
standing,] Twombly and Iqbal deal with a fundamentally different issue.”160  The 
plaintiff’s standing truly implicates jurisdiction, the court’s power to hear a case, 
because if the action proceeds when it is lacking, the court oversteps the 
constitutional requirement to address true controversies only.161  Standing therefore 
should be addressed under Rule 12(b)(1).  Hence, in Maya, the district court had 
erred by addressing standing under Rule 12(b)(6)—and, accordingly, it had erred by 
applying Iqbal.  The court of appeals explained: 
Twombly and Iqbal are ill-suited to application in the constitutional 
standing context because in determining whether plaintiff states a claim 
under 12(b)(6), the court necessarily assesses the merits of plaintiff’s 
case.  But the threshold question of whether plaintiff has standing (and the 
court has jurisdiction) is distinct from the merits of his claim.162 
This admirable clarity on standing doctrine and civil procedure exemplifies a 
court that has learned the teaching of Arbaugh and its associated cases.   
The Maya circuit-court holding did not mean that the trial court should have 
ignored the defendants’ challenge to the facts establishing plaintiffs’ standing, and 
simply assumed all the allegations were true.  In fact, as a result of the error, the trial 
court had “unnecessarily limited the scope of its review.”  Since the challenge was to 
jurisdictional facts, the judge should not have relied on the complaint’s allegations, 
but should have called for evidence to satisfy herself of the court’s jurisdiction.163  In 
scrutinizing the complaint only, then dismissing the case with prejudice, the judge 
had used Iqbal not to reject the sufficiency of the claim, but to deploy the wrong 
procedure and divest the court of power to resolve it.    
The approach to jurisdictional challenges after Iqbal taken by the Ninth Circuit in 
Maya sets up a circuit split with the Eighth Circuit.  As discussed below, boilerplate 
in the Eighth Circuit establishes that subject-matter jurisdiction challenges are 
                                                            
(“[J]urisdiction . . . is not defeated . . . by the possibility that the averments might fail to state a 
cause of action on which petitioners could actually recover.”). 
 160 Maya v. Centex Corp., 658 F.3d 1060, 1068 (9th Cir. 2011). 
 161 See Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346, 361-62 (1911) (if the court were to rule on 
a law’s constitutionality outside the context of deciding the rights of the litigants in justiciable 
controversies then “in a legal sense the judgment could not be executed”). 
 162 Maya, 658 F.3d at 1068 (citing Bell, 327 U.S. at 682). 
 163 As explained supra, notes 135-36 and accompanying text, a factual challenge to 
jurisdiction places the burden on the plaintiff, and frees the court from analyzing the 
complaint alone.  See City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 101-02 (1983) (“The 
plaintiff must show that he has ‘sustained or is immediately in danger of sustaining some 
direct injury’ as a result of the [defendant’s] conduct. . . .” (emphasis added)).  A facial 
challenge should lead to lenient reading of the complaint, but applying Iqbal instead confines 
the court to scrutinizing the complaint while requiring a plausible showing jurisdictional facts. 
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addressed under the Iqbal and Twombly plausibility standard.164  As a result, a panel 
of the Eighth Circuit in a 2009 case, Zanders v. Swanson, addressed the threshold 
question of standing under this standard.165  The issue was whether the plaintiffs 
could challenge a law under which they feared prosecution; they claimed that this 
fear chilled their free speech.  The requirement in such cases was that the fear of 
prosecution be “objectively reasonable,”166 and the court held that in this case it was 
not.  In reaching the determination that the asserted chill was based on a fear that 
was “too speculative,” the court deployed Twombly’s requirement of plausibility, 
applying it this time not to a conspiracy theory but to a future possibility:  “It is too 
speculative for standing purposes to allege that this statute could be manipulated or 
that the police might misuse the criminal justice system for retaliatory purposes . . . . 
Plaintiffs have thus not ‘nudged their claims across the line from conceivable to 
plausible.’”167  It is unclear, given the interplay of “reasonable” and “plausible” in 
this opinion, whether its holding could have been reached without the rhetoric of 
Twombly and the erroneous application of its heightened standard.168 
The Arbaugh line of cases, with their purposeful clarity on doctrine, demolish the 
Zanders court’s premise that a jurisdictional evaluation should be conducted in the 
same way as an evaluation of a claim’s legal merits.  Zanders, indeed, typifies the 
emergence of a new kind of “drive-by jurisdictional ruling.”  In such a ruling, a 
                                                            
 164 See Part V infra. 
 165 Zanders v. Swanson, 573 F.3d 591 (8th Cir. 2009). 
 166 Id. at 594 (citing Republican Party of Minn. v. Klobuchar, 381 F.3d 785, 792 (8th Cir. 
2004)).  Zanders addressed Article III standing, which implicates subject-matter jurisdiction; 
see further discussion infra at Part V.A.  So-called prudential standing raises different 
questions.  Unlike Article III standing, prudential standing does not implicate the existence of 
subject-matter jurisdiction, only the court’s willingness to exercise it.  Elk Grove Unified Sch. 
Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 11 (2004); see, e.g., Harold H. Huggins Realty, Inc. v. FNC, 
Inc., 634 F.3d 787, 795 n.2 (5th Cir. 2011) (“Unlike a dismissal for lack of constitutional 
standing, which should be granted under Rule 12(b)(1), a dismissal for lack of prudential or 
statutory standing is properly granted under Rule 12(b)(6).”).  It is appropriately addressed 
under Iqbal standards. See, e.g., Selevan v. N.Y. Thruway Auth., 584 F.3d 82, 92 (2d Cir. 
2009) (in section on prudential standing, rejecting defendant’s de minimis harm argument 
because “we need only consider whether the complaint alleges a plausible claim that the 
regulation violates the Commerce Clause” (emphasis added) (citing Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 566 
U.S. 662, 678-769 (2009)). 
 167 Zanders, 573 F.3d at 594 (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 554, 570 
(2007)).  Notably, the court reached this conclusion despite the fact that one of the plaintiffs 
actually claimed she had herself been charged under the challenged statute, for purposes that 
were at least implicitly improper.  Her individual case was dismissed not because it involved a 
conspiracy theory, but under an abstention doctrine because she was still involved in state 
court proceedings. 
 168 See also Novak v. Ind. Family & Soc. Servs. Admin., No. 1-10-cv-0677, 2011 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 34249, at *3 (S.D. Ind. Mar. 30, 2011) (not distinguishing between facial and 
factual jurisdictional challenges in stating that “surviving a Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss is 
more difficult” than satisfying the Twombly/Iqbal standard (citing United Phosphorus, Ltd. v. 
Angus Chem. Co., 322 F.3d 942, 946 (7th Cir. 2003) (factual challenge to subject matter 
jurisdiction))); id. at *11-12 (referring to what “appears to be alleged” in the complaint, rather 
than investigating the factual predicate of eligibility, to determine whether plaintiffs were 
eligible for Medicaid at the right time to establish injury, standing, and therefore jurisdiction). 
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federal court finds that an inadequately “plausible” pleading under the Iqbal standard 
divests the court of power to hear the case, even though longstanding precedent, 
undisturbed by Iqbal, allows for jurisdictional discovery to establish the predicate 
facts.  Like the “drive-by rulings” deplored by the Supreme Court in no uncertain 
terms,169 these decisions result when the doctrines of jurisdiction and legal 
sufficiency are muddled, and they exacerbate that confusion.  In these increasingly 
common rulings, courts unjustifiably apply to all components of a complaint the 
skepticism that Twombly and Iqbal encouraged for the treatment of conspiracy 
allegations.170  
The approach taken in Zanders is contradicted not just by the Ninth Circuit, but 
also by other law of the Eighth Circuit.  In another case involving standing, a 
different panel of the Eighth Circuit clearly applied separate standards for standing 
and legal merits:   
Whether Braden may pursue claims on behalf of the Plan at all is a 
question of constitutional standing [i.e., subject-matter jurisdiction] which 
turns on his personal injury. Whether relief may be had for a certain 
period of time is a separate question, and its answer turns on the cause of 
action Braden asserts.171 
After correctly clarifying that its approaches to jurisdiction and the merits were 
distinct, this panel reversed the lower court’s finding that there was no injury in 
fact.172  Only after settling the jurisdictional question of standing did the court turn to 
the 12(b)(6) motion at issue, and invoke Iqbal. 
E.  Reading Iqbal too Broadly Undermines Rule 12 Jurisprudence 
The confusion created in some lower courts by the multiple standards for 
motions to dismiss is hard to overstate.  One court appeared to invoke all three 
standards at once for the purposes of an inquiry into standing.173  In another instance, 
                                                            
 169 Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 91 (1998). 
 170 This error is not prevented in circuits where the appeals court has maintained careful 
distinctions between Iqbal requirements and standing requirements.  See, e.g., MVP Asset 
Mgmt. (USA) LLC v. Vestbirk, No. 2:10-cv-02483, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1889, at *11 
(E.D. Cal. Jan. 6, 2012) (using the Iqbal standard to dismiss a claim that used a “bare 
allegation” of the occurrence of a transaction to establish standing); Tini Bikinis-Saginaw, 
LLC v. Saginaw Charter Twp., No. 11-10280, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 147249, at *18 (E.D. 
Mich. Dec. 22, 2011) (quoting Iqbal in dismissing three of four claims for mootness, ripeness, 
and lack of standing, Rule 12(b)(1)); Stabiner v. United States, No. 11-3782, 2011 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 141574, at *6 (D.N.J. Dec. 9, 2011) (quoting Iqbal in dismissing tax claims for lack of 
standing, as relief was only declaratory). 
 171 Braden v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 588 F.3d 585, 592 (8th Cir. 2009) (emphasis added). 
 172 Id. (sustaining jurisdiction for the moment because “[a]t this stage in the litigation it is 
impossible to say” with certainty whether the timing of events supports the plaintiff’s standing 
(quoting Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992) (“standing must be shown 
‘with the manner and degree of evidence required at the successive stages of the 
litigation’”))). 
 173 NB v. Dist. of Columbia, No. 10-1511, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 86908, at *3-5 (D.D.C. 
July 29, 2011) (positing, for purposes of a single 12(b)(1) motion, the Conley standard, the 
factual-challenge standard burdening the plaintiff, and the Twombly standard, and concluding, 
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the complexity of the new three-tiered scheme utterly baffled the District Court of 
New Jersey, which reached a novel result by increasing the pleading standards for 
factual, rather than facial, 12(b)(1) motions.  Since factual challenges had never been 
tested by the 12(b)(6) standard, the rationale for this extension of Iqbal is worth 
quoting at length.  The question at hand was whether a factual dispute on an issue 
deemed jurisdictional under binding circuit precedent should be resolved by 
discovery or by analysis of the pleadings.  The court improvised: 
[I]t appears logical for the Supreme Court’s guidance in Iqbal to have at 
least a ripple effect on the standard applicable to factual challenges. Since 
the Supreme Court in Iqbal expressly guided that a plaintiff cannot obtain 
discovery with regard to his/her claims unless the plaintiff actually spells 
out the facts underlying these claims, the same guidance—if applied to 
factual rather than facial review—must yield the rule that a plaintiff 
cannot obtain discovery with regard to evidence verifying jurisdiction. . . .  
[A]llowing the plaintiff to conduct discovery for the purposes of factual 
challenge would result in an anomalous rule granting the plaintiff a 
broader pleading latitude for the purposes of the test under which the 
plaintiff’s pleadings are not even granted presumption of truth.174 
In the context of a factual 12(b)(1) challenge, this court made what seems a 
natural extrapolation from Twombly and Iqbal:  if pleading standards are raised for 
merits evaluations, they must be accordingly raised for jurisdictional evaluations.  
What the court missed, however, was the underlying rationale of Iqbal, which was to 
prevent costly, broad-ranging discovery on the merits, directed by the plaintiff.  
Iqbal was not intended to prevent tightly focused jurisdictional discovery to satisfy 
the court on its power to hear the case.  The court should have conducted more 
discovery; this would have reduced the need for analysis and surmise, in a ruling that 
spanned two-hundred pages, with regard to the factual predicates of the case.175  
On appeal, the circuit court followed the reasoning of Arbaugh and overruled its 
earlier precedent, thus establishing that the question being decided in the district 
court was a merits question and not a jurisdictional one.176  This meant that on 
                                                            
“Simply put, a pleading requires more than just ‘labels and conclusions.’” (citing Ashcroft v. 
Iqbal, 566 U.S. 662, 678 (2009))). 
 174 Animal Sci. Prods. v. China Nat’l Metals & Minerals Imp. & Exp. Corp., 702 F. Supp. 
2d 320, 334 n.6 (D.N.J. 2010). 
 175 Extensive factfinding was needed to address the question the district court attempted to 
resolve, but, following the example of Iqbal, the court refused to expand the evidentiary 
record.  Jurisdictional discovery might also have done the job, but a better solution was found 
by the circuit court, which followed Arbaugh.  The appeals court held that this issue was in 
fact not jurisdictional at all.  This holding meant that the survival of the lawsuit could be 
addressed in a simpler way on remand.  Animal Sci. Prods. v. China Minmetals Corp., 654 
F.3d 462, 469-70 (3d Cir. 2011) (“Unmoored from the question of subject matter jurisdiction, 
[conformity with the statute] becomes just one additional merits issue . . . . [T]he District 
Court may exercise its discretion ultimately to resolve this matter through other means, for 
example, by deciding the defendants’ original motions to compel arbitration.”). 
 176 Animal Sci. Prods. v. China Minmetals Corp., 654 F.3d 462, 465-68 (3d Cir. 2011) 
(citing Arbaugh, 546 U.S. at 515-16); see also Minn-Chem, Inc. v. Agrium Inc., 657 F.3d 650, 
659 (7th Cir. 2011) (strongly suggesting, but not reaching until “another day,” the conclusion 
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remand the court would be deciding a 12(b)(6) motion, not a 12(b)(1) motion, and no 
fact finding before discovery would be required.  In remedial fashion, the circuit 
court explained why this distinction matters practically: 
We catalogue just two of the significant differences between these two 
motions and how they may apply on remand in this case: First, the burden 
in a Rule 12(b)(1) motion rests with the plaintiff, who must establish [in a 
factual challenge] that there is subject matter jurisdiction; by contrast, the 
defendant carries the burden in a Rule 12(b)(6) motion. Accordingly, the 
burden on remand would no longer rest with the plaintiffs, but with the 
defendants. Second, while a court generally looks only to the face of the 
plaintiff’s complaint, must accept all alleged facts to be true, and is not 
permitted to make independent findings of fact when deciding a Rule 
12(b)(6) motion, a court may examine evidence and resolve factual 
disputes on a Rule 12(b)(1) motion. . . .  It would . . . be inappropriate for 
the District Court, on remand, to assess independently the credibility of 
allegations asserted by plaintiff’s expert witness.177 
In applying Iqbal outside its proper context, the district court in Animal Science 
had given plaintiffs both the detriment of a factual 12(b)(1) analysis, in which no 
presumption of truth attaches to the complaint’s allegations, and the detriment of a 
12(b)(6) analysis, in which contested legal conclusions are ignored rather than 
resolved.  The result was an overly skeptical reading of the complaint.  In the circuit 
court, on the other hand, the guidance of Arbaugh led to clarity on the doctrine.  
Without such clarity, as the circuit court recognized,178 Iqbal disrupts jurisdictional 
analysis and causes problems the Supreme Court never intended.   
The same mistake was made in the personal-jurisdiction context by a Maryland 
District Court in 2011, although this time the court carefully explained its reasoning:   
The Supreme Court’s decisions in Twombly and Iqbal did not specifically 
address the pleading requirements for jurisdiction, and the issue has not 
been resolved by the Fourth Circuit. . . .  [But] similar language is used in 
Rule 8 to describe the requirements for pleading both claims in a 
complaint and the grounds for jurisdiction. . . .  Indeed, it would be highly 
incongruous to require separate pleading standards for two subsections of 
the same rule. Moreover, the factual nature of the claims surrounding the 
grounds for jurisdiction are, more often than not, intertwined with the 
factual allegations showing that the pleader is entitled to relief. As such, 
this Court concludes that the pleading standards articulated in Twombly 
and Iqbal apply to Rule 8(a)(1).179 
                                                            
that Arbaugh and Morrison would require the same doctrinal change in antitrust law in that 
circuit); Carrier Corp. v. Outukumpo Oyj, 673 F.3d 430, 439 n.4 (6th Cir. 2012) (same). 
 177 Animal Sci., 654 F. 3d at 470 n.9 (citatons omitted). 
 178 Id. at 470. 
 179 Haley Paint Co. v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., No. RDB-10-0318, 2011 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 34925, at *20-22 (D. Md. Mar. 31, 2011).  This holding is now the governing law in 
the District of Maryland for challenges to personal jurisdiction.  See Mykey Tech., Inc. v. 
TEFKAT LLC, No. 12-cv-01468, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 110122 (D. Md. Aug. 7, 2012); 
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As it turned out, since it refused to order jurisdictional discovery, the court had to 
revisit this ruling in light of new facts fifteen months later, after further evidence 
emerged in discovery on related claims.180  In any event, its failure to consult 
Supreme Court doctrine on the stark difference between jurisdiction and merits led it 
to the wrong outcome as a matter of doctrine.181 
F.  The Special Case of Jurisdictional Statutes:   
Stating a Claim Under the Alien Torts Statute 
To be sure, the errors involved in Zanders, Animal Science, and Haley Paint are 
not always based on a misreading of Iqbal’s aims; such procedural miscues can also 
be motivated by the same legitimate policy concerns that motivated Iqbal.  The 
Eleventh Circuit, for example, has seized on the Iqbal plausibility standard as part of 
its jurisprudence on 12(b)(1) issues in international human-rights cases.  The 
statutory authority for such charges in federal court, the Alien Tort Statute, is often 
read to confer jurisdiction to U.S. courts only if the crime alleged is a clear and 
definite element of international law,182 in the way piracy was in 1789 when the 
statute was passed.183  Thus evaluating the legal sufficiency of claims under the 
                                                            
C.R. Daniels, Inc. v. Naztec Intern. Grp., LLC, No. 11-01624, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 138871, 
at *10 (D. Md. Dec. 2, 2011). 
 180 Haley Paint Co. v. E.I. Dupont de Nemours & Co., No. RDB-10-0318, 2012 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 46875, at *14 (D. Md. Apr. 3, 2012). 
 181 Another Maryland District Court recently replicated this mistake in the context of 
subject-matter jurisdiction, although it did not affect the outcome.  The court found that the 
complaint satisfied Iqbal because it mentioned that the fax number used in the case was of the 
kind used in mass-marketing campaigns: 
Brey has alleged sufficient facts to support the $5 million amount-in-
controversy requirement [for diversity jurisdiction under the Class 
Action Fairness Act]. Brey avers that LQ sent “unsolicited facsimile 
advertisements to tens of thousands of consumers” over “the past four 
years” and has put forth enough facts to show that such allegations are 
plausible. This is all that the Iqbal and Twombly pleading standard 
requires.   
Brey Corp. v. LQ Mgmt. LLC, No. AW-11-cv-00718, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 125903, at *8 
(D. Md. Nov. 1, 2011) (emphasis added). 
 182 See Richard J. Goldstone, International Jurisdiction and Prosecutorial Crimes, 47 
CLEV. ST. L. REV. 473, 474 (1999) (“The origins of international jurisdiction [generally], 
certainly in modern times, lie in the development of the concept of ‘crimes against 
humanity.’”). 
 183 Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 732-33 (2004).  Even though the statute only 
confers jurisdiction, whether its applicability in a given case is truly a jurisdictional matter is a 
matter of considerable disagreement.  See Shepherd, supra note 8, at 2327 n.72 (“[T]he Sosa 
Court never explicitly stated whether it was dismissing the claims based on lack of jurisdiction 
or for failure to state a claim for relief.”).  See generally Roe v. Bridgestone Corp., 492 F. 
Supp. 2d 988, 1002 (S.D. Ind. 2007) (explaining the conundrum, and persuasively rejecting “a 
standard that blurs the line between subject matter jurisdiction and the sufficiency of a claim 
on the merits”) (citing Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 89 (1998) and Bell 
v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 682 (1946)).  Roe shows persuasively that the better approach is to 
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Alien Tort Statute arguably implicates a federal court’s subject-matter jurisdiction, 
and vice versa.184  Many circuits, including the Eleventh, regard as jurisdictional the 
issue of what crimes are included.185  This in turn makes Rule 12(b)(1) the proper 
framework; nonetheless, the Eleventh Circuit has established that its courts should 
apply Iqbal to determination of these questions.186   
In the leading Eleventh Circuit case, a U.S. corporation was allegedly in league, 
through its local affiliate, with Colombian paramilitary forces that violently 
suppressed union activity.187  The circuit court affirmed the finding that the 
complaint “fell short of pleading the factual allegations necessary to invoke the 
court’s subject matter jurisdiction under the [Alien Tort Statute].”188  As in Iqbal, the 
court held that plaintiffs had “insufficiently pled a conspiracy,” this one “between 
the local facilities’ management and the paramilitary officers.”189  Unlike in Iqbal, 
though, the court held that this insufficiency in the pleadings (along with inadequate 
allegations of state action) not only canceled the lawsuit but actually divested the 
court of its power to hear the case.  The introduction of Iqbal was straightforward:  
the court cited recent circuit precedent for the proposition that in “a Rule 12(b)(1) 
facial challenge a plaintiff has ‘safeguards similar to those retained when a Rule 
12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim is raised.’”190  This outdated 
                                                            
assume jurisdiction, then treat issues about international norms under Rule 12(b)(6).  See 
Shepherd, supra note 8, at 2328-29 (favorably describing Roe). 
 184 The same is true in evaluating whether the Federal Tort Claims Act has been 
successfully invoked.  28 U.S.C.S. § 1346(b) (LexisNexis 2010) (United States’ sovereign 
immunity is waived only “under circumstances where the United States, if a private person, 
would be liable to the claimant.”).  The statute arguably confers jurisdiction only if the tort 
claim is successful on the merits.  Hence any element of the claim could arguably be contested 
in a motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.  See Erin M. Watkins, The Scope 
of Employment Requirement of the Federal Tort Claims Act: The Impropriety and 
Implications of the Monez Decision, and the Superior Jurisdictional Prima Facie Approach, 
17 GEO. MASON L. REV. 533, 534 (describing circuit split as to 12(b)(1) or 12(b)(6) status of 
the FTCA defense that federal employee’s tortious act was not embraced by the jurisdictional 
statute, because committed outside the scope of employment). 
 185 Sinaltrainal v. Coca-Cola Co., 578 F.3d 1252, 1260–61 (11th Cir. 2009); cf. Sarei v. Rio 
Tinto PLC, 650 F. Supp. 2d 1004, 1021 n.44 (C.D. Cal. 2009) (“[T]he initial jurisdictional 
inquiry in an [Alien Tort Claims Act] case does not evaluate whether the cause of action will 
turn out to be well founded in law and fact.”) (quoting Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC, 487 F.3d 
1193, 1200 (9th Cir. 2007) (in turn citing Bell, 327 U.S. at 682-83)). 
 186 See Shepherd, supra note 8, at 2341-44 (describing the approach of the Sinaltrainal 
court, in contrast to the Second Circuit, and showing that prior Eleventh Circuit approaches to 
Alien Tort Statute cases underlie its readiness to apply Iqbal to jurisdictional disputes in such 
cases). 
 187 Sinaltrainal, 578 F.3d at 1260–61. 
 188 Id. 
 189 Id. 
 190 Id. at 1260 (quoting McElmurray v. Consol. Gov’t of Augusta-Richmond Cnty., 501 
F.3d 1244, 1251 (11th Cir. 2007)).   
36https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol60/iss3/10
2012] RIPPLE EFFECTS 835 
 
cross-reference in turn activated Iqbal, and required plausibility of the plaintiffs’ 
claims.191 
The conspiracy allegations in Sinaltrainal invite comparisons with Iqbal itself, 
and its holding can be defended as another instance of identifying plaintiff’s failure 
to plead plausible facts adequate to activate a federal statute.  The only difference is 
that the statute happened to be one that operates solely to confer jurisdiction.192  
Though the substantive outcome is defensible by analogy to Iqbal, the case’s 
citations on procedure do not support its approach.  The court was correct to note 
that recent circuit precedent stated that facial 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) plaintiff 
safeguards are similar—and that precedent postdated Twombly.  But the precedent 
went on to explain clearly that in a facial challenge, the court was authorized 
“merely to look and see if [the] plaintiff has sufficiently alleged a basis of subject 
matter jurisdiction . . . [T]he allegations in his complaint are taken as true for the 
purposes of the motion.”193  It admonished, moreover, that if the challenge disputes 
the alleged jurisdictional facts, “the district court must give the plaintiff an 
opportunity for discovery and for a hearing that is appropriate to the nature of the 
motion to dismiss.”194  This would seem to foreclose the 12(b)(1) approach taken in 
Sinaltrainal.  Moreover, tracing back any of the citations in that 2007 precedent 
leads the student of civil procedure to Bell v. Hood, the pathbreaking Supreme Court 
decision distinguishing between 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) motions.195   
In the context of the Alien Tort Statute, other circuits have taken a different 
approach than the Eleventh for a variety of reasons.196  It seems indisputable, though, 
                                                            
 191 See Shepherd, supra note 8, at 2342 (showing how the outcome of Sinaltrainal hinged 
on application of the plausibility standard); see also Abdullahi v. Pfizer, Inc., 562 F.3d 163, 
172 n.6 (2d Cir. 2009) (reviewing under the Twombly standard lower court’s hybrid 
determination “that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction because plaintiffs failed to state claims 
under the ATS”). 
 192 Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 712 (2004) (Alien Tort Statute as “only 
jurisdictional”); see also Olivier Plantation, LLC v. St. Bernard Parish, 744 F. Supp. 2d 575, 
582 (E.D. La. 2010) (in the context of a different jurisdictional statute, the Federal Tort 
Claims Act, granting 12(b)(1) motion under Iqbal standard because plaintiff landowners’ 
claims did not establish jurisdiction to access federal court to redress emergency actions taken 
after Hurricane Katrina). 
 193 McElmurray, 501 F.3d at 1251 (quoting Lawrence v. Dunbar, 919 F.2d 1525, 1529 
(11th Cir. 1990)). 
 194 Id. (emphasis in original) (citing Williamson v. Tucker, 645 F.2d 404, 414 (5th Cir. 
1981)). 
 195 See Lawrence, 919 F.2d at 1529 (citing Menchaca v. Chrysler Credit Corp., 613 F.2d 
507, 511 (5th Cir. 1980) and Williamson, 645 F.2d at 413 (“It is elementary that a district 
court has broader power to decide its own right to hear the case than it has when the merits of 
the case are reached.”) (citing Menchaca, 613 F.2d at 516)); Menchaca, 613 F.2d at 516 (case 
should be dismissed for want of subject-matter jurisdiction “only if the federal claims are 
‘wholly insubstantial or frivolous’”) (quoting Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 682-83 (1946)).   
 196 See Al-Quraishi v. Nakhla, 728 F. Supp. 2d 702, 716-17, 735 (D. Md. 2010) (using 
different standards for jurisdiction and merits, and concluding, for example, that before 
discovery “it is clearly too early to dismiss Defendants on the basis of derivative sovereign 
immunity”) (citing Schrader v. Hercules, Inc., 489 F. Supp. 159, 161 (W.D. Va. 1980)), rev’d 
on other grounds sub nom. Al-Quraishi v. L-3 Servs., Inc., 657 F.3d 201, 205 (4th Cir. 2011) 
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that no longstanding precedent or policy justifies the Eleventh Circuit procedure of 
applying Iqbal to jurisdictional questions as a matter of course.   It is true that 
Sinaltrainal bears some resemblance to Iqbal, and can be justified with some of the 
Twombly policy rationales for dispensing with the case before discovery.  In 
addition, it raises issues of international diplomacy that counsel caution.  But the 
doctrinal foundation of the Sinaltrainal approach is tenuous.   
G.  The Special Case of Jurisdictional Elements in the Cause of Action:  
Pleading Interstate Commerce 
Reading the complaint skeptically in all its aspects, as Iqbal seems to encourage, 
leads to early jurisdictional dismissals of suspect reliability.  One instructive instance 
of the error of disavowing jurisdiction under Iqbal occurred in the Southern District 
of Mississippi in 2010, in a suit alleging anticompetitive conduct in price quotes for 
rounds of golf.197  Before addressing the substance of Sherman Act unfair-
competition claims, courts have to determine as a factual matter whether interstate 
commerce is involved, because if not, subject-matter jurisdiction is lacking.198  It 
would be unconstitutional to apply the Congressional statute if the case involved 
purely local commerce, outside Congress’s power to regulate.  Atypically, this 
threshold inquiry is required not only to test the claim’s legal sufficiency, but also to 
test whether adjudicating the claim is within the scope of federal power.199  The 
upshot of this quirk in the Sherman Act is that the dispositive motion in the 
Mississippi case, Gulf Coast, tested whether the court had subject-matter 
jurisdiction.200  Under this procedural posture, the plaintiffs should have been 
                                                            
(“we have accepted as true the plaintiffs’ allegations that the defendants engaged in a 
conspiracy with military personnel to torture them, abuse them, and cover up those actions”);  
see also Doe v. Nestle, S.A., 748 F. Supp. 2d 1057 (C.D. Cal. 2010) (analyzing viability of 
Alien Torts Statute claim solely under Rule 12(b)(6), without questioning subject-matter 
jurisdiction); Chowdhury v. Worldtel Bangladesh Holding, 588 F. Supp. 2d 375, 379 
(E.D.N.Y. 2008) (noting in a discussion of Twombly’s applicability “the very substantial issue, 
one that has recently divided a panel of the Second Circuit, as to whether there are separate 
tests for analyzing subject matter jurisdiction and failure to state a claim under the [Alien 
Torts Statute]”) (citing Khulumani v. Barclay Nat’l Bank Ltd., 504 F.3d 254 (2d Cir. 2007) 
(per curiam)).   
 197 Gulf Coast Hotel-Motel Ass’n v. Miss. Gulf Coast Golf Course Ass’n, No. 
1:08CV1430, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 81211, at *4 (S.D. Miss. Aug. 10, 2010). 
 198 McLain v. Real Estate Bd., 444 U.S. 232, 242 (1980) (“[J]urisdiction may not be 
invoked under [the Sherman Act] unless the relevant aspect of interstate commerce is 
identified; it is not sufficient merely to rely on identification of a relevant local activity and to 
presume an interrelationship with some unspecified aspect of interstate commerce.”); cf. 
Howard M. Wasserman, Jurisdiction and Merits, 80 WASH. L. REV. 643, 660-61 
(contending that “jurisdictional elements” like effect on interstate commerce should be 
handled in 12(b)(6) motions, as they establish an aspect of the claim). 
 199 McLain, 444 U.S. at 242; see also Mortensen, v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 549 F.2d 
884, 891 (3d Cir. 1977) (“That the same phrase [in the Sherman Act, ‘commerce among the 
several States,’] is both an element of the offense and a vital prerequisite for federal court 
jurisdiction has caused considerable confusion.”).  
 200 See generally Mortensen, 549 F.2d at 891 (finding dubious “the propriety of dismissing 
Sherman Act claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction at a pretrial stage when relevant 
facts are in dispute, and relevant discovery has not been completed”). 
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required only to satisfy Rule 8(a)(1), by giving a “short and plain statement of the 
grounds for the court’s jurisdiction,” and if facts were in question the court should 
have undertaken jurisdictional discovery. 
None of the rationales of Iqbal applied to this jurisdictional issue, since no 
expensive discovery or disruptive depositions of high-level officials would be 
required to determine whether the greens fees charged to plaintiffs’ customers had 
interstate effects.   The court just had to satisfy itself that the golf controversy was 
not purely local, like a child’s lemonade stand.  If it were, the issue would be outside 
Congress’s power to regulate, and hence outside the court’s power to adjudicate.  
Moreover, as a policy matter, the threshold plausibility under Iqbal should not have 
been the issue:  the interstate quality of the commerce in such a case defines the type 
of case in question, not the merits of the specific claim.201  Hence the legal 
sufficiency of the complaint should have been tested under Conley, or its factual 
sufficiency tested using the court’s own fact-finding powers. 202 
Instead, the district court applied the Iqbal test and found that it lacked 
jurisdiction.  The complaint’s relevant paragraphs, it said, “contain purely 
conclusory allegations as to the purported impact of Defendants’ conduct on 
interstate commerce.”203  Assertions in subsequent briefs—specifically, “that the vast 
majority, if not all, of the customers who purchase these vouchers are out of state 
customers”—were ignored as the court focused on the four corners of the 
complaint.204  As a result, the plaintiffs had ostensibly failed to “make the requisite 
showing that the activities in question were sufficiently in interstate commerce” to 
establish federal-court jurisdiction.205  But neither Supreme Court precedent on the 
Sherman Act206 nor the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require the complaint to 
make a particularized showing to defeat a 12(b)(1) motion:  a preliminary showing in 
                                                            
 201 McLain, 444 U.S. at 243 (“Even where there is an inability to prove that concerted 
activity has resulted in legally cognizable damages, jurisdiction need not be impaired.”). 
 202 See, e.g., Jessie v. Potter, 516 F.3d 709, 712 (8th Cir. 2008) (noting that a Rule 12(b)(1) 
ruling may resolve disputed facts, while a 12(b)(6) dismissal must be decided on the 
pleadings); see also McLain, 444 U.S. at 246 (“Th[e] [lenient Conley] rule applies with no less 
force to a Sherman Act claim, where one of the requisites of a cause of action is the existence 
of a demonstrable nexus between the defendants’ activity and interstate commerce.” (quoting 
Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957)); see also id. at 243 (specifying that this is a 
“jurisdictional element”); Mortensen, 549 F.2d at 892 (suggesting that because the interstate-
commerce test is so closely entwined with the merits, in factual 12(b)(1) challenges under the 
Sherman Act “we feel it is incumbent upon the trial judge to demand less in the way of 
jurisdictional proof than would be appropriate at a trial stage”). 
 203 Gulf Coast Hotel-Motel Ass’n v. Miss. Gulf Coast Golf Course Ass’n, No. 
1:08CV1430, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 81211, at *16 (citing Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 
678 (2009)). 
 204 Id. at *18, *21.  The court pointed out that authorities suggesting otherwise predated 
Twombly. 
 205 Id. at *16-17 (emphasis added). 
 206 McLain, 444 U.S. at 242-43 (“to establish jurisdiction a plaintiff must allege the critical 
relationship in the pleadings[,] and if these allegations are controverted must proceed to 
demonstrate by submission of evidence beyond the pleadings” that the commerce is interstate) 
(emphasis added). 
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the complaint is needed on the substance of a claim, not to establish jurisdiction.  
Rule 8(a)(1) requires only a statement of the grounds for a court’s jurisdiction.   
In Gulf Coast, the district court should have acknowledged and credited the 
allegation that the plaintiff hotels were involved in interstate commerce (unless it 
was obviously “completely devoid of merit”207).  If the fact was contested by the 
defendants, the court should have permitted thorough jurisdictional discovery, or 
held hearings later, to resolve the question as a matter of fact.208  Instead the decision 
was based only on serially amended complaints. 
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit reversed the district court’s holding on jurisdiction, 
and remanded.  Unfortunately, it did so not by correcting the standard of review but 
by reading the complaint more attentively under the wrong standard.209  Since the 
plaintiffs had alleged that out-of-state golfers came to the resort, the circuit court 
held that they had shown enough factual matter to satisfy Iqbal.210  Even though the 
issue at hand was jurisdictional, the circuit court believed that the analysis had to be 
adjusted for Iqbal.  Disagreeing with the district court, it found that the complaint 
was adequate under the heightened pleading standard.211  But the opinion implied212 
that absent a passing reference to out-of-state golfers, it might have found a lack of 
                                                            
 207 Oneida Indian Nation of N.Y. v. Cnty. of Oneida, 414 U.S. 661, 667 (1974). 
 208 See, e.g., Jerome B. Grubart, Inc. v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 513 U.S. 527, 
537-38 (1995) (“Normal practice permits a party to establish jurisdiction at the outset of a case 
by means of a nonfrivolous assertion of jurisdictional elements, and any litigation of a 
contested subject-matter jurisdictional fact issue occurs in comparatively summary procedure 
before a judge alone.”) (citations omitted); cf. Montez v. Dep’t of Navy, 392 F.3d 147, 150 
(5th Cir. 2004) (“[W]here issues of fact are central both to subject matter jurisdiction and the 
claim on the merits, we have held that the trial court must assume jurisdiction and proceed to 
the merits.”). 
 209 The trickiness of the distinction between jurisdiction and merits in this scenario has a 
long history: in 1976, the Supreme Court acknowledged that the issues overlapped in Sherman 
Act cases, but noted that “our analysis in this case would be no different” as between 12(b)(1) 
and 12(b)(6) analyses.  Hosp. Bldg. Co. v. Trs. of Rex Hosp., 425 U.S. 738, 742 n.1 (1976) 
(“In either event, the critical inquiry is into the adequacy of the nexus between respondents’ 
conduct and interstate commerce that is alleged in the complaint.”).  After Twombly, it is no 
longer the case that the two analyses are procedurally identical. 
 210 Gulf Coast Hotel-Motel Ass’n v. Miss. Gulf Coast Golf Course Ass’n, 658 F.3d 500, 
506 (5th Cir. 2011). 
 211 Id. at 506 n.3 (“No party here argues that Summit Health is no longer good law in light 
of Twombly or Iqbal.  Indeed, at least one of our sister circuits has recently relied on Summit 
Health.”) (citing Yakima Valley Mem. Hosp. v. State Dep’t of Health, 654 F.3d 919 (9th Cir. 
2011)) (citing Summit Health, Ltd. V. Pinhas, 500 U.S. 322 (1991) (establishing the threshold 
test for such claims)).  But see Yakima Valley, 654 F.3d at 924, 932 (addressing whether 
complaint stated a claim under 12(b)(6), not jurisdiction under 12(b)(1), and not invoking 
Iqbal in section on the jurisdictional issue of standing) (citing City of Los Angeles v. Cnty. of 
Kern, 581 F.3d 841, 845 (9th Cir. 2009) (jurisdictional issue of standing addressed without 
reference to Twombly or Iqbal)). 
 212 Gulf Coast, 658 F.3d at 506 (noting that “the allegations in this complaint that the Golf 
Association’s anticompetitive acts ‘substantially affected interstate commerce’ [would] not 
[be] sufficient on their own” to establish jurisdiction after Iqbal). 
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jurisdiction from the face of the complaint, even though significant case law213 
suggested it should draw the contrary inference in the case of a golf resort.  It gave 
no indication that further jurisdictional discovery might have been appropriate.  
In the end, nothing turned on the pleading standard in Gulf Coast, since the 
circuit court found that the complaint satisfied either standard, and the lower court 
might have reached the same result by applying the Sherman Act requirement 
without framing it in jurisdictional terms.  In applying Iqbal to focus on the 
complaint alone, though, both courts regarded jurisdiction and statement of a claim 
as the same category of requirement, in defiance of the Arbaugh line of cases.214  To 
be sure, the procedural error here arose in part from the confusing double-status of 
the required nexus with interstate commerce, which is a “jurisdictional element” of a 
Sherman Act claim.  Nonetheless, Gulf Coast stands in the Fifth Circuit for the 
erroneous proposition that Iqbal requires a complaint to show, not just to state, the 
grounds for subject-matter jurisdiction.215  Accordingly it suggests, erroneously, that 
a jurisdictional statement is to be read with the same skepticism the Twombly court 
applied to statements of the merits of a claim. 
IV.  THE ERROR ENTRENCHED  
The error of applying Iqbal to jurisdictional questions propagates through the 
federal court system in two different ways.  The first has to do with the way courts 
read Iqbal itself, and sometimes take it to authorize more skeptical reading of 
complaints regardless of the procedural posture of the case.  This error was 
exemplified in Haley Paint, where the district court tackled the issue as a matter of 
“first impression,” and compared Rules 8(a)(1) and 8(a)(2) without noticing that the 
latter requires the plaintiff to “show” something, while the former requires only a 
                                                            
 213 See id. (citing cases about hotels and summer camps for the principle that “[e]ven when 
business activities are purely local, if it is interstate commerce that feels the pinch, it does not 
matter how local the operation which applies the squeeze”) (quoting Camps 
Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, Me., 520 U.S. 564, 573-74 (1997)). 
 214 See id. at 507 (mingling 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) terminology by holding that the 
complaint “states a claim with respect to subject matter jurisdiction”).  The error is 
particularly notable in both courts in light of the fact that the district court cites Arbaugh as 
part of its boilerplate on subject-matter jurisdiction.  Gulf Coast Hotel-Motel Ass’n v. Miss. 
Gulf Coast Golf Course Ass’n, No. 1:08CV1430, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 81211, at *9. 
 215 See also Castro v. United States, 560 F.3d 381, 386 (5th Cir. 2009) (Rule 12(b)(1) 
motion should be granted only “if it appears certain that the plaintiff cannot prove a plausible 
set of facts that establish subject-matter jurisdiction” (emphasis added)), vacated, 608 F.3d 
266, 268 (5th Cir. 2010) (en banc) (Stewart, J., dissenting) (indicating that ruling applies the 
same standard:  “[t]he majority acknowledges that we have before us a Rule 12(b)(1) 
dismissal, but it erroneously concludes that Castro has not met her burden under Twombly and 
Iqbal”); Lane v. Halliburton, 529 F.3d 548, 566 (5th Cir. 2008) (evaluating only “plausible 
set[s] of facts” consistent with the complaint to determine subject-matter jurisdiction) (citing 
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007)).  But cf. Adapt v. Cnty. of El Paso, 
No. EP-10-CV-307-PRM, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 98113, at *11 (W.D. Tex. May 17, 2011) 
(refusing to convert a 12(b)(1) motion to a 12(b)(6) motion, to address substance of motion to 
dismiss, because defendant had wrongly “cite[d] to Twombly in the same paragraph in which 
it argues that the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction”). 
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“statement.”216  Similarly, the improvisations of the Animal Science court resulted 
from the novelty of Iqbal.  As circuit courts absorb Iqbal into binding precedents, 
though, such errors will become less common.     
The second kind of error propagation, though, is considerably more difficult to 
prevent.  It results from one of the strengths of the common-law system:  the fact 
that district courts generally do not improvise, but draw on previous rulings in order 
to describe the rules and the procedures for following them.  As we have seen, this 
means that the standard rule of thumb equating factual approaches to 12(b)(6) and 
facial 12(b)(1) analyses has often been restated and re-applied, even after it has 
ceased to be correct.  Worse yet, it means that an error in a circuit-court analysis gets 
transplanted, like a virus, into contexts where it can have much larger effects. 
A.  Erroneous Application of the Iqbal Pleading Standard Increasingly Disrupts 
Jurisprudence on Standing 
In the Eighth Circuit, analysis of plaintiff’s standing to sue has on several 
occasions deployed the Iqbal standard.  The Zanders case described above has been 
cited dozens of times, and in one case its formulation of the “nudged across the line” 
Twombly standard for plausibility was re-quoted and applied three times for 
jurisdictional questions.217  But Zanders itself seemed sound even to the careful law 
clerk:  it had drawn on unquestioned circuit precedent.  In a 2007 case, a panel of the 
Eighth Circuit had, in passing, endorsed the use of Iqbal in determining standing. 
[Since] the district court addressed a deficiency in the pleadings, our 
standard of review is the same standard we apply in Rule 12(b)(6) cases.  
We accept as true all factual allegations in the complaint, giving no effect 
to conclusory allegations of law. The plaintiff must assert facts that 
affirmatively and plausibly suggest that the pleader has the right he claims 
(here, the right to jurisdiction), rather than facts that are merely consistent 
with such a right.218 
In this case, Stalley v. Catholic Health Initiatives, the plaintiff was a lawyer who 
claimed for himself the right to pursue private insurers who failed to reimburse 
Medicare for expenses caused by their customers’ own malpractice.  There was a 
statutory basis for this argument, but the statute assigned the right to the patients 
themselves, not to third parties.  Lacking an injury-in-fact or any artificial qui tam 
standing,219 the lawyer was sent away empty-handed after straightforward statutory 
                                                            
 216 Haley Paint Co. v. E.I. DuPont De Nemours & Co., No. RDB-10-0318, 2011 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 34925, at *21 (D. Md. Mar. 31, 2011). 
 217 Farm-To-Consumer Legal Def. Fund v. Sebelius, 734 F. Supp. 2d 668, 686, 688, 690 
(N.D. Iowa 2010). 
 218 Stalley v. Catholic Health Initiatives, 509 F.3d 517, 521 (8th Cir. 2007) (citing Mattes v. 
ABC Plastics, Inc., 323 F.3d 695, 697-98 (8th Cir. 2003) and Twombly, 550 U.S. at 553-56) 
(emphasis added). 
 219 In a qui tam action the party filing the complaint lacks actual standing to bring the case, 
and therefore is called the relator (or “informer”) rather than the plaintiff.  The action is 
constitutional because there is a “case or controversy” between the government and the 
defendant.  See Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 120 (1968) (citing Marvin v. Trout, 199 U.S. 212, 
225 (1905)); United States ex rel. Hall v. Tribal Dev. Corp., 49 F.3d 1208, 1213 (7th Cir. 
1995) (“it is the government, not the individual relator, who is the real plaintiff in the suit”). 
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analysis.220  Nothing in the case hinged on the matter of plausibility.  Nonetheless, 
the new boilerplate for the Eighth Circuit had now been written (replacing the pre-
Twombly case Mattes, which was cited for the equivalence between 12(b)(1) and 
12(b)(6) approaches).  In four years, Stalley has been cited thirty-four times by 
district courts in the Eighth Circuit for cases involving subject-matter jurisdiction.221 
Hence, instead of simply reading the Zanders case in order to understand the 
rationale applying Iqbal standards to the jurisdictional question of injury-in-fact, a 
clerk (or attorney) must read at least three other cases:  Stalley, Mattes, and Iqbal.  
Without the awareness of the doctrinal niceties, even then such a clerk is unlikely to 
see any problem with Stalley’s formulation of the test for jurisdiction.  The 
excellence of the automatized Federal Rules, which are applied uniformly by 
ongoing citations from precedent to precedent, becomes a weakness in such a 
scenario.  The Stalley court’s incautious handling of the standard of review set an 
error propagating rapidly:  in two years, Eighth Circuit district courts have now in 
turn cited Zanders for the approach to jurisdictional questions no less than thirty-five 
times.222 
                                                            
 220 Many courts might have considered the Stalley dismissal a matter of “prudential,” or 
“statutory,” standing, since it hinged on whether “the legal rights of third parties” created by a 
federal law “implie[d] a right of action in the plaintiff.”  Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 501 
(1975); see also Tribal Dev., 49 F.3d at 1215 (observing that the Eighth Circuit atypically 
regards applicability of a qui tam statute as a matter of prudential standing) (citing Schmit v. 
Int’l Fin. Mgmt. Co., 980 F.2d 498, 498 (8th Cir. 1992) (per curiam)).   
In the Eighth Circuit, atypically, prudential standing is considered a jurisdictional bar:  it is 
raised on a 12(b)(1) motion and can even be challenged in the appeals court after not being 
raised at trial.  See, e.g., South Dakota v. Dep’t of the Interior, No. 11-1745, 2012 U.S. App. 
LEXIS 597, at *9, *11 (8th Cir. Jan. 11, 2012) (dismissing case in response to a prudential-
standing argument raised “for the first time on appeal”).  This allowed the Stalley ruling on 
prudential standing to set Eighth Circuit precedent for all subject-matter jurisdiction analyses.  
Cf. Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 11 (2004) (prudential standing 
concerns can lead the court to refrain from hearing a suit “[e]ven in cases concededly within 
[its] jurisdiction”). 
 221  In addition, the Second Circuit has used Stalley to support a tenuous reading of its own 
precedent that apparently required plausible pleadings to establish standing:   
[T]o survive [the] Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss, Amidax must allege facts that 
affirmatively and plausibly suggest that it has standing to sue [citing Selevan v. N. Y. 
Thruway Auth., 584 F.3d 82, 88 (2d Cir. 2009), and Stalley, 509 F.3d at 521] . . . .  
What is missing [in the complaint] is factual support for Amidax’s allegation that 
SWIFT handed over Amidax’s financial information to the government.  Only if such 
factual support exists can Amidax nudge its alleged injury from one that is 
conceivable to one that is plausible. 
Amidax Trading Grp. v. S.W.I.F.T. SCRL, No. 09-3293-cv, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 25074, at 
*9, *13 (2d Cir. Dec. 19, 2011) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 680 (2009)).  This 
was both an erroneous standard and a misreading of Selevan.  As observed supra note 166, the 
Selevan court had not used the Iqbal standard for Article III standing, but for prudential 
standing.  In the Second Circuit, prudential standing is not a jurisdictional matter.  Arar v. 
Ashcroft, 532 F.3d 157, 172 (2d Cir. 2008) (“prudential standing [is] the sort of ‘threshold 
question . . . [that] may be resolved before addressing jurisdiction’”) (quoting Tenet v. Doe, 
544 U.S. 1, 6-7 n.4 (2005)). 
 222 Shepard’s “restrict by headnote” search conducted December 28, 2011. 
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Leniency in jurisdictional pleading standards does not constitute overall leniency 
in assuming jurisdiction.  In the leading recent Supreme Court case on standing, a 
conservative five-judge majority carried out a significant tightening of the 
requirements for constitutional standing.223  Finding a lack of subject-matter 
jurisdiction both factually and facially, the Court dismissed a plaintiff’s action 
despite a congressionally created cause of action in an environmental law.224  Even 
here, however, the Court made clear that adverse jurisdictional rulings must not 
occur on a slender factual record.  If a court is to be divested of its power to hear a 
case, it may not do so merely on the basis of a scanty complaint:  “At the pleading 
stage, general factual allegations of injury resulting from the defendant’s conduct 
may suffice, for on a motion to dismiss we presume that general allegations embrace 
those specific facts that are necessary to support the claim.”225  This premise of the 
standing analysis under Rule 8(a)(1) is incompatible with the new Rule 8(a)(2) Iqbal 
pleading standard; the two should not be conflated.  Even when extending minimal 
generosity toward plaintiffs, as in Lujan, the Supreme Court still insists that 
jurisdictional pleadings be read leniently. 
B.  Erroneous Application of the Iqbal Pleading Standard  
Creates Unreasonable Outcomes 
Other circuits have done better than the Eighth at keeping distinct the standards 
for 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) analyses.  But even in the circuits that have been most clear 
on the topic, small mistakes are quickly reproduced and magnified.  For example, in 
September 2009, a panel of the Ninth Circuit mentioned in passing that it was 
applying Iqbal to determine whether jurisdiction had been established against the 
Kingdom of Spain, to overcome its sovereign immunity.226  Although this standard 
had no effect on the analysis, and although an en banc panel revisited the decision 
and made no mention of Iqbal,227 one district court had already picked up on the 
error and replicated it.228  That district-court ruling, Sustainable Delta, applied Iqbal 
                                                            
 223 Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992); cf. id. at 579 (Kennedy, J., 
concurring in the judgment) (“I am not willing to foreclose the possibility, however, that in 
different circumstances a nexus theory similar to those proffered here might support a claim to 
standing.”). 
 224 Id. at 576 (public interest cannot “be converted into an individual right by a statute that 
denominates it as such”). 
 225 Id. at 561 (contrasting this standard with the standard of review at the summary-
judgment stage). 
 226 Cassirer v. Kingdom of Spain, 580 F.3d 1048, 1052 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009). 
 227 Cassirer v. Kingdom of Spain, 616 F.3d 1019, 1022 n.1 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc) 
(noting simply that “we take the facts as alleged in the complaint as true because we are 
reviewing a denial of a motion to dismiss” (citing Altmann v. Rep. of Austria, 317 F.3d 954, 
961-62 (9th Cir. 2002))). 
 228 Coal. for a Sustainable Delta v. Fed. Emergency Mgmt. Agency, 711 F. Supp. 2d 1152, 
1158 (E.D. Cal. 2010) (“The standards used to resolve motions to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) 
are relevant to disposition of a facial attack under 12(b)(1).”) (citing Cassirer, 580 F.3d at 
1052 n.2); see also id. at 1159 n.2 (noting that the previous circuit standard for rulings on 
standing, requiring only “general factual allegations,” had been “issued before the Supreme 
Court’s paradigm-shifting ruling in Iqbal”). 
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to a jurisdictional analysis, and was cited in turn in January 2011 in a brief in the 
Northern District of California in Coalition for ICANN Transparency v. VeriSign, 
Inc., an antitrust case already well into its fifth year.   
The initial dismissal on the merits in ICANN229 had been overturned by the Ninth 
Circuit on appeal,230 and the case was remanded for re-pleading and discovery.  But 
the defendants now contended that the plaintiffs lacked standing, and had not 
conformed their allegations of standing to Iqbal and Twombly.231  Although standing 
is jurisdictional, and therefore should not be affected by Iqbal scrutiny, the court was 
persuaded by the brief:  it examined the allegations of standing and found that the 
revised complaint “fail[ed] to allege facts showing that [plaintiff’s injured members] 
were financial supporters or members at the time the complaint was filed in 
2005.”232  Hence, the plaintiffs had not alleged standing except in a conclusory 
fashion.  This should have satisfied Rule 8(a)(1), but the court found it lacking by 
the Iqbal Rule 8(a)(2) standard.   
While dismissing one component of the claim on the merits again, the ICANN 
court disposed of the bulk of the case a second time around for jurisdictional 
reasons, even though the circuit court had remanded the case to be heard.  Thus 
Iqbal, working its way into the analysis through dicta in a little-known previous 
ruling, allowed the district court on remand to dispose of the case yet again because 
the complaint had listed the plaintiff’s member organizations incorrectly.233  The 
case settled in May, 2011, after 333 docket entries.234 
It is certainly possible that the second ICANN dismissal was correct.  If the 
plaintiff had replaced constituent organizations during the course of the litigation, 
and now was relying on different antitrust injuries than the litigation had begun with, 
that would raise a legitimate standing problem.  But instead of ordering its own 
                                                            
 229 Coal. for ICANN Transparency Inc. v. VeriSign, Inc., 464 F. Supp. 2d 948, 965 (N.D. 
Cal. 2006). 
 230 Coal. for ICANN Transparency, Inc. v. VeriSign, Inc., 567 F.3d 1084, 1096 (9th Cir. 
2009) (finding two out of three claims adequately stated, and failing to acknowledge Twombly 
precedent on adequacy of pleadings in antitrust cases), reprinted as amended at 611 F.3d 495, 
509 (9th Cir. 2010) (reaching same result using Twombly terminology, and reminding district 
court to expect third revised complaint to be amended to satisfy Twombly and Iqbal). 
 231 Reply Memorandum of Defendant Verisign, Inc. in Support of Motion to Dismiss 
Plaintiff Coalition for ICANN Transparency, Inc.’s Third Amended Complaint, No. 05-cv-
04826-RMW, 2011 U.S. Dist. Ct. Motions LEXIS 1238, at *10-11 (Jan. 21, 2011) 
(contending that in the amended complaint the plaintiff “ignore[s] its pleading obligations 
under Iqbal/Twombly and the standard for demonstrating standing under federal law”). 
 232 Coal. for ICANN Transparency Inc. v. VeriSign, Inc., 771 F. Supp. 2d 1195, 1200 
(N.D. Cal. 2011) (emphasis added). 
 233 Plaintiffs’ Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Opposition to Verisign, Inc.’s 
Motion to Dismiss CFIT’s Third Amended Complaint, No. 05-cv-04826 RMW, 2011 U.S. 
Dist. Ct. Motions LEXIS 1237, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 18, 2011) (“CFIT has disclosed, both in 
discovery and in earlier filed pleadings, the names of members who satisfy the same standing 
requirements as those who have withdrawn.”). 
 234 Order on Stipulation for Dismissal of Action Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 41(A) and for Retention of Jurisdiction over Action to Enforce Settlement, No. 05-
CV-04826 PACER/ECF No. 333, (N.D. Cal. May 31, 2011). 
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discovery to satisfy itself as to its jurisdiction, the court used the heightened Iqbal 
standard to disclaim its power to act, rather than resolving the factual dispute or 
reaching the merits.  This is the sort of outcome that sharp merits/jurisdiction 
distinctions are meant to prevent.  
C.  Heightened Jurisdictional Pleading Standards Have  
Significant Constitutional Implications 
One consolation in light of this propagating error might be that these doctrinal 
questions are theoretical, and unlikely to have an impact in any case of great national 
moment.  If a complaint is weakly pleaded and fails firmly to establish a case or 
controversy to invoke jurisdiction, it seems unlikely that anything significant is at 
stake for society.  This consolation is unsustainable, however, in light of a Tennessee 
district court’s 2010 decision in Shreeve v. Obama.235  The motion to dismiss the 
lawsuit’s challenge to the constitutionality of the 2010 Patient Protection and 
Affordable Care Act hinged on whether the plaintiffs had standing to bring the case 
before the law’s individual mandate to buy health insurance took effect.  The court 
posited that the facial 12(b)(1) challenge about standing should lead it to “review the 
motion similarly as it would a Rule 12(b)(6) motion,” and cited the Iqbal and 
Twombly plausibility standards.236  Accordingly, it evaluated only “the complaint on 
its face,”237 and declined to “consider facts [in responsive briefs] that could have 
been pleaded in Plaintiffs’ original complaint and amended complaints.”238  Because 
it found a lack of jurisdiction, the court “expresse[d] no opinion on the merits of 
Plaintiffs’ or Defendants’ arguments regarding the constitutionality of the 
[Affordable Care Act].”239 
The prevalence and entrenched character of the jurisdictional Iqbal error raise 
concerns that the Supreme Court takes seriously.  If courts divest themselves of 
power to hear cases, rather than reaching the merits, less is accomplished to resolve 
difficult problems of law and policy.  Litigation can drag on for many months before 
a motion to dismiss is granted on jurisdictional grounds.  Such resort to technicalities 
to wash the court’s hands of a case may be a smaller problem than the problem of 
protracted, expensive discovery addressed by Twombly, but it is a real problem 
nonetheless.  And it is a problem more fundamental to the U.S. system of justice.  
The importance of procedural leniency in accepting jurisdiction was reaffirmed by 
the Supreme Court in 2010, in a case that carried remarkable echoes of the original 
affirmation of lenient pleading standards, Conley v. Gibson.   
At the opening of its ruling in Union Pacific the Court quoted the first Supreme 
Court Chief Justice: 
                                                            
 235 Shreeve v. Obama, No. 1-10-CV-71, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 118631 (E.D. Tenn. Nov. 
4, 2010); cf. Peterson v. United States, 774 F. Supp. 2d 418, 421 (D.N.H. 2011) (using non-
Iqbal standards to evaluate jurisdictional pleadings of Medicare recipient seeking to challenge 
Affordable Care Act (ACA)). 
 236 Shreeve, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 118631, at *2; see also id. at *10 (holding that 
“Plaintiffs’ complaint fails to plead sufficient facts to establish jurisdiction”). 
 237 Id. at *6. 
 238 Id. at *11 (ignoring allegation that certain healthcare providers were given an “unfair 
competitive advantage” by ACA regulations on tanning salons). 
 239 Id. at *2. 
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“It is most true that this Court will not take jurisdiction if it should not,” 
Chief Justice Marshall famously wrote, “but it is equally true, that it must 
take jurisdiction if it should. . . .  We have no more right to decline the 
exercise of jurisdiction which is given, than to usurp that which is not 
given.”240 
Like Conley, this case was about a dispute involving the employment conditions of 
railway workers and the authority of the National Railway Adjustment Board.  This 
time, though, it was not a lower federal court, but the Board itself, that had divested 
itself of jurisdiction to hear the case.241  It found, late in the proceedings, that the 
parties had failed to state, in their filings with the Board, that they had attempted 
arbitration as the rules required.  There was no dispute that the arbitration had in fact 
been attempted, but the parties had not said so up front.  Determining that this 
undermined, not the merits of the case, but the Board’s own jurisdiction, the panel 
had canceled the proceedings and undone its own participation in the dispute.242   
In Union Pacific, the Supreme Court delivered a forceful rebuke to this 
maneuver, and in doing so reasserted its own authority to correct errors:  “By 
presuming authority to declare procedural rules [governing initial filings] 
‘jurisdictional,’ the panel failed to conform, or confine itself, to matters [Congress 
placed] within the scope of [NRAB] jurisdiction.”243  The Court reversed and 
remanded.  As in the lower courts in Conley, the Board’s cramped reading of the 
initial filings had created an abrupt dismissal of a case for jurisdictional reasons.  
The Supreme Court saw this as a betrayal of a tribunal’s duty to exercise its power 
and decide cases.   
Paradoxically, then, according to the Supreme Court, the Board had exceeded its 
mandate by declining to hear a case. 244  The irony of exceeding power by renouncing 
it, as the Board had done in Union Pacific and the lower courts had done in Conley, 
should not be unfamiliar to students of constitutional law and civil procedure.  It is, 
after all, the way the Supreme Court gained the power of judicial review in the first 
place.245  Rather than addressing the merits of Marbury v. Madison, a politically 
untenable proposition, Chief Justice Marshall washed the Court’s hands of the case 
by finding a lack of jurisdiction over it.246  The holding of this seminal case was 
                                                            
 240 Union Pac. R.R. v. Bhd. of Locomotive Eng’rs & Trainmen Gen. Comm. of 
Adjustment, 130 S. Ct. 584, 590 (2009) (citing Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. 264, 404 (1821)). 
 241 Id. 
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 243 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 244 Cf. Anthony Andricks, Note, Creating Diversity Jurisdiction in Removal Actions 
through the Improper Use of Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 21, 60 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 249, 261-67 (2012) 
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 246 Id. at 178 (holding unconstitutional the jurisdictional statute that enabled the case to be 
brought). 
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simply that the Supreme Court could not hear the case until it had been heard by a 
lower court.247   
In proclaiming its impotence, the Marbury Court ingeniously laid claim for 
posterity to unforeseen strengths in the judiciary.  Instead of attempting to match its 
power of command with the executive branch, it struck down a jurisdictional grant 
of Congress and pronounced predominant its own authority to determine what the 
law is.248  Thus the Court greatly expanded the acknowledged breadth of its power 
by leveraging a technicality of civil procedure.  Such extensions of power are rarely 
in the spirit of the Constitution, and achieving them through subterfuge is called for 
only once in the life of a political system.  When they forswear jurisdiction now 
under Iqbal pleading standards, instead of following the Federal Rules, lower federal 
courts improperly reenact this primal gesture of power. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
It is now possible to see the value of the Supreme Court’s sustained attention to 
the distinction between failure to state a claim and lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.  
Until Iqbal, the issue was largely theoretical or academic, having few real-world 
consequences.  Since the standards of review for each motion were the same, a 
working mastery of civil procedure did not require clarity in distinguishing 12(b)(1) 
and 12(b)(6) matters.  That state of affairs has now changed, due to Iqbal’s alteration 
of the requirements for adequate statement of a claim.  The “showing” required by 
Rule 8(a)(2) should now be judged by a different standard from the “statement” of 
jurisdiction required by Rule 8(a)(1).  Hence the distinction between jurisdictional 
matters and matters of legal sufficiency has significant real-world implications.   
It is hard to prevent courts from erring by treating identically these two threshold 
requirements of the complaint, and harder to eradicate the error once it has appeared 
in a circuit.  Without attentive remedial work in the courts of appeal, Rule 12 
jurisprudence faces the prospect of gradual further erosion of jurisdictional doctrine 
and imprecision in civil procedure.  The two trends reinforce each other, and only 
the Supreme Court is in a position to halt the spiral.   
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